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THE LAW OF
ALIMONYt
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article provides a detailed study of alimony, its development,
purpose, function and measure. It is a study of alimony with a theme. It
recognizes that although one hopes that all marriages will endure forever,
some fail to meet that standard. Alimony should provide a means of en-
suring that neither party is unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged for ser-
vices rendered to the family during the marriage. Alimony, ironically,
may be a symbolic means of recognizing and promoting the traditional
family, as well as the loyalty and devotion needed for healthy families.
The opportunity to protect and compensate for that loyalty and the
human capital of which it is constituted, paradoxically, is realized when a
lengthy marriage breaks down. Therefore, the theme of this article is that
alimony should be utilized appropriately to provide a means of economi-
cally equalizing parties to a dissolved marriage. Significantly, in order to
equalize parties when one of them has spent a large portion of her life
rearing the children and caring for the needs of the household, it is neces-
sary to compensate her for that time and effort by awarding alimony.
Respect, honor, promotion of the family and devoted parenting have
traditionally been part of American rhetoric. Yet, they dissolve rather
quickly and seem somewhat hypocritical when a long-term marriage ends
and the spouse who has remained at home, having to rear the children
and care for the home at the cost of never starting or ending early her
career development, receives no compensation for that human cost and
capital. The spouse who has pursued his career will be compensated
throughout his life for that development. Analogously, the other spouse
t This article is an adaption of a chapter written by the author for a treatise on family law
entitled: C. BLAKESLEY, J. PARKER & L. WARDLE, CoNTEMPoRARY FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES,
POLICY AND PRACTICE (1987).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center; B.A., University of Utah, 1969;
M.A., The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1970; J.D., University of Utah College of
Law, 1973; L.L.M., Columbia University School of Law, 1976; J.S.D., Columbia University
School of Law, 1985.
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should also be compensated for her services to the family. This theme
runs throughout each section of this article as the key to understanding
the proper function of alimony. The history and early conceptual devel-
opment of alimony; the authority and jurisdiction to award it; its current
function, purpose and measure; alimony for a specific term (rehabilitative
alimony); alimony and the professional license or degree; fault and the
determination of alimony; and the effects of modification, termination,
enforcement and the Full Faith and Credit Clause on the alimony award
will be considered.
The policy of awarding the payment of alimony to a wife as an inci-
dent of divorce migrated to America with the English common law. Al-
though the American law of marriage has always been controlled by civil
law, the notion of marriage and alimony developed in the ecclesiastical
courts of medieval England. Prior to the promulgation of the Divorce Act
of 1857, the ecclesiastical courts in England exercised jurisdiction over
matrimonial causes of action.1 These courts generally enforced rules of
canon law,' which had evolved in the civil and natural law traditions on
the Continent. Marriage in this tradition and under the canon law was
based on contract theory, but was also considered a sacrament.8 As a sac-
rament, it was indissoluble." Although marriage was indissoluble, "di-
vorces," really forms of annulment, were granted by the ecclesiastical
courts in certain limited circumstances.'
A divorce a vinculo matrimonii was a decree nullifying the marriage
contract because of an impediment that existed at the time of the mar-
' See Vernier & Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present
Statutory Structure, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 197 (1939). The Divorce Act of 1857, 20
& 21 Vict., ch. 85, terminated the divorce jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts in England. Id.
at 198. Alimony was clearly not within the jurisdiction of the equity courts, but was exclu-
sively within the competence of the ecclesiastical courts. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMES-
Tic RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 14.1, at 421 (1968) (citing Anonymous, 89 Eng. Rep.
941 (K.B. 1683); Ball v. Montgomery, 30 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ch. 1793)). However, equity would
enforce separation agreements. See Head v. Head, 26 Eng. Rep. 1115 (Ch. 1747); Angier v.
Angier, 24 Eng. Rep. 222 (Ch. 1718). Equity would also assist in the enforcement of alimony
decrees of the ecclesiastical courts. See H. CLARK, supra, § 14.1, at 421. See, e.g., Dawson v.
Dawson, 32 Eng. Rep. 71 (Ch. 1803). The Divorce Act of 1857 allowed absolute divorce by
judicial decree and removed such power from the ecclesiastical courts. See Vernier & Hurl-
but, supra, at 198.
' See Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 1, at 197. See also A. OGLE, THE CANON LAW IN MEDIE-
VAL ENGLAND 52-53 (1912) (comparison of Roman canon law with English church and state
law on marriage and divorce).
3 See Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 161 Eng. Rep. 665, 669 (Ecc. 1811).
See R. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 74 (1974); Vernier & Hurl-
but, supra note' 1, at 197. See also Evans v. Evans, 161 Eng. Rep. 466, 467 (Ecc. 1790)
(marriages are indissoluble).
" See R. HELMHOLZ, supra note 4, at 76-100.
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riage.6 In effect, the ecclesiastical court ruled that the marriage never le-
gally existed at all and was void (or voidable) ab initio.7 Ecclesiastical law
did not allow the wife to receive permanent alimony after a divorce a
vinculo matrimoniis Dissolution of a valid marriage by absolute divorce
required a private act of Parliament.9 This type of divorce developed as
an alternative method to dissolve marriages, particularly when there were
no grounds for annulment.
A judicial separation, known as a divorce a mensa et thoro, was
granted for reasons of adultery, cruelty, or "spiritual" fornication (apos-
tasy or heresy)."0 This separation decree did not dissolve the marriage
bond, but allowed the man and wife to live separate and apart from each
other. The decree prohibited a later marriage." Alimony awards were
permitted pursuant to decrees of divorce a mensa et thoro.1 2
The exact rationale upon which medieval alimony decrees were based
is unclear. One canonist believed that a divorce a mensa et thoro left the
husband's duty to support his wife intact and alimony payments were
merely a continuation of this duty."8 This conclusion appears to be logical
and sound. On the other hand, several medieval decisions appear to con-
sider alimony, or other means of supporting the wife after the divorce a
mensa et thoro, as being based on an agreement between the parties.1" It
is unclear what the term "agreement" meant in this context. Did it mean
that the courts believed that the parties bargained over support pay-
ments? This is doubtful, considering the beliefs regarding marriage and
the relative independence of the parties. If based on an agreement, was
alimony a voluntary obligation? Was the notion of an agreement simply
an aphorism based on the notion of marriage as a "civil contract?" 5 In
6 See R. HELMHOLZ, supra note 4, at 75, 500; Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 1, at 197-98
(citing 2 R. BURN, THE ECCLESIASTICAL LAW (9th ed. 1842)).
7 See R. HELMHOLZ, supra note 4, at 74; Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 1, at 197-98.
1 See Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 1, at 201. See also Bird v. Bird, 161 Eng. Rep. 227
(Ecc. 1754). In Bird, a husband obtained a divorce a vinculo matrimonii based on his wife's
previously existing valid marriage. See id. at 227-28. The ecclesiastical court held that be-
cause there was a "nullity of marriage by reason of a former [one]" no alimony could be
granted to the wife. Id. at 228.
' See Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 1, at 198. "If the party injured wishes to marry again,
application must be made to Parliament for an act of the legislature to dissolve the marriage
entirely." 2 R. BURN, THE ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 502 (9th ed. 1842).
o See R. HELMHOLZ, supra note 4, at 100.
See id.
See, e.g., Cooke v. Cooke, 161 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1073 (Ecc. 1812) (wife granted divorce and
alimony award due to husband's adulterous activities).
"s See R. HELMHOLZ, supra note 4, at 106 n.114. See also H. BASS & M. REIN, DIVORCE OR
MARRIAGE 31 (1976); H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.5, at 420 (1968).
' See R. HELMHOLZ, supra note 4, at 106-07.
" 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *185.
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that sense, the parties voluntarily agreed to enter into this marriage sta-
tus and to assume the obligations appertaining thereto.1"
Leading sixteenth century English ecclesiastics claimed the power to
grant a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on the ground of adultery.1 7 By the
beginning of the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, the position of the Church of
England was that after a divorce a vinculo matrimonii for adultery was
granted, each party became free to marry another. 18 Since divorce a
vinculo matrimonii was essentially an annulment and the parties were
viewed as if they had never been married, it was natural to allow them to
marry again. It is further noted that, during this time, men took the op-
portunity to repudiate their wives for adultery and to enter into "second
marriages."'19
16 Burn, in his study on ecclesiastical law, divides support payments into two categories:
alimony, which is established by the judicial act of a court of justice; and separate mainte-
nance, which is established by agreement of the parties. See 2 R. BURN, supra note 9. See
also Corbett v. Poelnitz, 99 Eng. Rep. 940 (K.B. 1785). In Corbett, a creditor sued a woman
who had agreed to a separation with her former husband. See id. at 940-41. The husband
had agreed to pay maintenance payments to his wife. See id. at 940. The general rule re-
garding creditors' suits against wives was that, inasmuch as a married woman had no prop-
erty, her personal contracts were void and she could not be sued on them. Id. at 942. How-
ever, in this instance, King's Bench ruled that the woman was liable for all debts, even
though still married because her separate maintenance payments allowed her to act as a
"femme sole" (independent woman). See id. at 943. Lord Mansfield noted that: "[in mod-
ern days, a new mode of proceeding has been introduced, and [agreements] have been al-
lowed under which a married woman assumes the appearance of a feme [sic] sole .... In the
ancient law there was no idea of a separate maintenance." Id.
If Lord Mansfield's last sentence is a sound proposition, rather than merely a justifica-
tion snatched from the great jurist's perceptions of history and ancient law, separate main-
tenance agreements would appear to be of relatively recent origin in England. Very few
medieval ecclesiastical court decisions mention alimony or any other form of support for the
wife at all. See R. HELMHOLZ, supra note 4, at 106. Those that do mention it, consider
support as an "agreement" between the parties. See id. at 106-07. Thus, it appears that
alimony decrees made by courts are of very recent origin (late 18th to early 19th century)
and that voluntary separate maintenance agreements were the only form of support for a
separated wife until that time.
17 See Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 1, at 197 n.3. Protestant canonists attempted to re-
form ecclesiastical laws to allow absolute divorce on the grounds of adultery, desertion, long
absence, mortal enmities, and lasting fierceness of a husband to his wife. They wanted the
divorce a mensa et thoro to be abolished as unnecessary, because of the more significant
breadth of absolute divorce. Parliament, in 1551, partially approved of this view of the Prot-
estant canonists; however, the power to make ecclesiastical law remained vested in the eccle-
siastical courts. Hence, no change in the law evolved at this point. See 2 R. BURN, supra
note 9, at 503.
18 See id. Burn states: "In the beginning of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the opinion of the
Church of England was that after a divorce for adultery, the parties may marry again." Id.
See also 2 G. HOWARD, A HISTORY ov MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 81 (1904) ("New marriages
were freely contracted after obtaining divorce from unfaithful partners.").
19 See R. HOULBROOKE, CHURCH COURTS AND THE PEOPLE DURING THE ENGLISH REFORMATION
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The ecclesiastical courts would have been presented with an interest-
ing question if women had been able to take advantage of this opportu-
nity to repudiate their spouses for adultery and to receive a divorce a
vinculo decree. Would these women be eligible to receive alimony? If they
were, that alimony would not have been based on the husband's duty to
support his wife during marriage because no such duty would have arisen
due to the retroactive effect of the annulment. Although this apparently
did not ever arise, at the close of Elizabeth's reign, official Church opinion
was altered to remove adultery as a cause for divorce a vinculo ma-
trimonii. In the case of Rye v. Fuliambe (Foljambe's Case),20 the Star
Chamber held that adultery was cause only for an action for divorce a
mensa et thoro.2 ' Inasmuch as divorce a mensa et thoro was really a legal
separation from bed and board, it was natural to award alimony based on
the husband's duty to support his wife and, therefore, the obligation to
support would continue.
By the nineteenth century, policies of social economy and fault pro-
vided the underlying rationale for alimony payments.22 The wife's prop-
erty at marriage, according to the common law of England, vested in her
husband. The courts reasoned that a portion of the income and value that
this property generated for or added to the family could be assigned or
allocated to the maintenance and support of the wife when she and her
husband were separated pursuant to their divorce a mensa et thoro.2 If
the husband had been the adulterer, he was considered to have been "at
fault" and to have caused the divorce a mensa et thoro; thereby separat-
ing the wife from both matrimonial and familial society.24
The ecclesiastical judge was the sole person to determine the amount
of alimony to be awarded. He had absolute discretion, but considered
such factors as the need of the wife and the ability of the husband to
pay.25 Presently, courts continue to consider both of these factors along
with many others discussed below. The ecclesiastical court also consid-
ered the support of the children when determining the amount of alimony
to be awarded to the wife.2 As previously noted, another important fac-
tor which greatly affected the support award was the notion of the par-
70 (1979).
2 72 Eng. Rep. 838 (K.B. 1602).
1 See id.
" See, e.g., Cooke v. Cooke, 161 Eng. Rep. 1072, 1072 (Ecc. 1812) (husband committed
adultery); Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 1, at 198 (recompense of wife matter of social
economy).
"3 See Cooke, 161 Eng. Rep. at 1073.
24 See Otway v. Otway, 161 Eng. Rep. 1092, 1093 (Ecc. 1813).
" See Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 1, at 198-99.
"0 See id. at 199.
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ties' respective and relative guilt or fault as to the marital breakdown.27
Early in the development of this canon law determination of alimony, a
wife who was guilty of an indiscretion would receive nothing from her
husband. Later, alimony was granted to the wife, even if the she was at
fault, as a condition placed upon the innocent husband before he would
be granted a divorce. The courts reasoned that, regardless of whether the
wife was guilty of an indiscretion or not, she still needed support;2" thus,
the notion that the award of alimony after the divorce was encouraged by
an underlying policy of having someone other than the public support the
spouse. Since the husband (today, either spouse) had committed himself
to care for his spouse "until death," this commitment would last until
death as long as it was needed and he had the ability to pay.
After the ecclesiastical courts eliminated the utilization of fault to
determine whether the wife ought to receive alimony, the primary objec-
tive of an order decreeing the payment of permanent alimony was to pro-
vide continuing support for the wife who would otherwise be without
means.29 In determining the amount to be awarded, the courts generally
looked to the amount of the husband's income 0 and granted a reasonable
proportion to the wife for her "comfortable subsistence."' 1 The courts
were also concerned with the husband's obligation to support his chil-
dren, 2 and any special needs of the wife." Therefore, even at this early
stage in the development of alimony, the application of a sort of formula
considering need and the ability to pay is apparent. Moreover, the ten-
dency to aggregate the husband's obligation to support his wife and his
children is also evident-a tendency which causes confusion and
problems today. Finally, ecclesiastical judges had the authority to modify
an alimony decree when the circumstances of the parties changed in a
manner that impacted on need or ability to pay, although few such modi-
fications were actually granted. 4
Enforcement of an alimony order was often accomplished by the pro-
217 See id.
28 See id. at 200-01.
29 See id. at 198.
30 See, e.g., Kempe v. Kempe, 162 Eng. Rep. 668, 669 (Ecc. 1828); Smith v. Smith, 161 Eng.
Rep. 1105, 1105 (Ecc. 1813).
"' Kempe, 162 Eng. Rep. at 669.
32 See Street v. Street, 162 Eng. Rep. 196, 197-98 (Ecc. 1823); Blaquiere v. Blaquiere, 161
Eng. Rep. 1319, 1319 (Ecc. 1820).
22 See, e.g., Durant v. Durant, 162 Eng. Rep. 667, 668 (Ecc. 1826) (wife in delicate health
and mother of a large family).
' See De Blaquiere v. De Blaquiere, 162 Eng. Rep. 1173, 1175-76 (Ecc. 1830). See, e.g., Neil
v. Neil, 162 Eng. Rep. 1446, 1447 (Ecc. 1832) (as reduction in husband's income caused by
unwise investments, modification not granted).
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cess of excommunication from the Church.35 Courts could also utilize the
common law writ de estoveriis habendis (of recovering estovers) to force
recovery of alimony. 0 At times, the Chancellor would compel payment by
issuance of a writ ne exeat Regno.3 7 After Parliament abolished excom-
munication for civil purposes, alimony decrees were enforced by contempt
and sequestration by the High Court of Chancery."
Much of the family law in America was imported from English eccle-
siastical law as it had developed before the Divorce Act of 1857. Similarly
to the English view, the essence of alimony was perceived to be the en-
forcement of the husband's canon/common law duty to support his wife. 9
A perception of this nature was quite logical under English ecclesiastical
law since the divorce to which it applied was really only a legal separation
from bed and board. It was harder to rationalize the continuation of the
support obligation in America where one could obtain a definitive di-
vorce.40 Today, it is incorrect to say that support during marriage or ali-
mony after dissolution is based upon the husband's duty to support his
wife. There should be no problem, however, in recognizing a commitment
on the part of each spouse to support the other during and, depending on
conditions, even after marriage. Notwithstanding the difficulty in articu-
lating the logic of awarding alimony after divorce, it has been awarded
consistently in America from "the earliest colonial times to the
present."'4 1
A logical but rarely articulated justification for the continuation of
support is that once one commits to a marriage, he has committed him-
self to support and maintain his spouse in accordance with his abilities
and the spouse's needs for life, or until remarriage, unless circumstances
arise which would terminate or alter that obligation. Other justifications
for or perceived central purposes of alimony that have been articulated
include that alimony represents damages for breach of the marriage cove-
nant,42 or a penalty imposed upon the guilty spouse.4 3 These latter two
See 2 R. BURN, supra note 9, at 505-06; Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 1, at 201.
See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189.
07 See Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 1, at 201 (citing 3 E. DANIELL, PLEADING AND PRACTICE
OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 1996 (2d ed. 1851)).
" See id. at 201 & n.41.
09 See, e.g., Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945) (duty to provide support is
not a debt but obligation imposed by law). See also H. BASS & M. REIN, supra note 13, at
31; H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 6.1, at 181, § 14.5, at 441. The husband's common law duty to
support his wife depended upon the existence of a valid marriage. See 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARA-
TION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NuPTIAL CONTRACTS § 15.01, at 83 (rev. ed. 1987).
" See H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.1, at 421.
" Id. (citing 2 G. HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 332, 338, 339, 349, 368,
370, 374, 377 (1904); 3 G. HOWARD, 28-30, 90-95 (1904)).
"0 See H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.1, at 422. See, e.g., Driskill v. Driskill, 181 S.W.2d 1001,
1004 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944) (alimony constitutes damages for breach of marriage contract).
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bases for justifying alimony are anachronistic, although approximately
seventeen states still allow fault to be considered as a factor in deciding
the issue of alimony44 and for some it is even a bar to receiving alimony. 3
Another view is that alimony is necessary to keep the formerly dependent
spouse off the public dole.4 6 The suggestion has also been made that
"[t]he economic rationale for alimony may be closer to that which under-
lies the payment of severance pay and other forms of unemployment
compensation. 4 7 Thus, there are various interpretations by the courts
and commentators regarding the primary purpose of permanent mainte-
nance or post-decretal alimony.
Defining alimony has been described as similar to trying to grab a
slippery fish.4 This is not surprising in light of the history of alimony;
evolving from the ecclesiastical notion, wherein no permanent dissolution
was contemplated, to the American concept, controlled by its ecclesiasti-
cal history but functioning within a secular setting which would recognize
permanent dissolution and attempt to develop justification for perma-
nent, post-decretal alimony. Given this dispute over definition and pur-
pose, it should not be surprising that predictability is not the byword for
alimony orders. Nevertheless, alimony today, more often referred to as
"8 See H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.1, at 421-22 (citing Lewis v. Lewis, 202 Ark. 740, 151
S.W.2d 998 (1941)); see also Gusman v. Gusman, 140 Ind. 433, 39 N.E. 918 (1895). Contra
Bonanno v. Bonanno, 4 N.J. 268, 274, 72 A.2d 318, 320 (1950) (alimony not meant to punish
guilty husband); Miles v. Miles, 185 Or. 230, 202 P.2d 485 (1949) (guilty husband may not
be penalized by large alimony award); 2 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 14.06 (2d
ed. 1961) (rejecting idea that alimony intended to punish the guilty).
" Many states retain fault as a factor to be considered in determining who should receive
alimony and how much they should receive. Some of the states include: Alabama, Connecti-
cut, Florida, Georgia (adultery is bar), Hawaii (the court shall consider the parties' respec-
tive merits), Louisiana (alimony allowed for spouse without marital fault), Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Missouri, North Carolina (adultery is a bar), Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina (adultery is a bar), Tennessee, Virginia (fault is a bar), West Virginia. See gener-
ally Recent Cases, Divorce-Fault is Relevant in Determination of Alimony in Divorce Ac-
tion Brought Under No-Fault Prolonged Separation Statute: Flanagan v. Flanagan, 87
HARv. L. RE. 1579 (1974).
" See, e.g., Broussard v. Broussard, 462 So. 2d 1386, 1387-89 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (perma-
nent alimony denied because of wife's unjustified refusal to have sexual intercourse with
husband); Rutherford v. Rutherford, 452 So. 2d 432, 433 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (paying spouse
has burden of proving post-separation fault on the part of receiving spouse, which, if
proved, would bar alimony); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 148, 160 (West Supp. 1988); W. VA.
CODE § 48-2-15(i) (1986).
46 See H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.5, at 442 (alimony "prevents the wife from becoming a
financial burden to the community"); see also Taake v. Taake, 70 Wis. 2d 115, 122, 233
N.W.2d 449, 453 (1975) (Heffernan, J., dissenting) (alimony prevents dependent spouse
from becoming a public charge).
'" R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 5.3, at 109 (2d ed. 1977).
, Elrod, The Widening Door of Alimony, 8 FAM. ADvoc. 4 (1986).
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maintenance,' 9 may be defined as the monetary support of one spouse by
the other spouse 0 following their legal separation or the dissolution of
their marriage. This support may be based upon need and ability to pay,
with the concept of need including the element of a right. This right is
based upon recognition of and compensation for the receiving spouse's
contribution to the family and concomitant cost in loss of earning capac-
ity caused by devotion of time and talent to the family rather than to
career development.
The obligation to pay and the opportunity to receive alimony has
been gender-neutral since the Supreme Court's decision in Orr v. Orr,"1
and the promulgation of gender-neutral statutes pursuant to that deci-
sion. Indeed, some forty states had already "de-sexed" their alimony stat-
utes prior to the Orr decision." The duty to pay alimony would arise es-
sentially if there were need on the part of the receiving spouse and ability
to pay on the part of the paying spouse. 5 The determination to award
alimony may occur at two stages: first, at the time of the decision to
award a separation from bed and board (temporary support or mainte-
nance); and, second, when permanent divorce or dissolution is awarded
(permanent alimony or maintenance).5' Technically, temporary alimony
is the actual enforcement of the duty to continue support because the
marriage is still in existence. Permanent alimony is awarded only after
the dissolution of a valid marriage, although some states allow it after
annulment. 55
Traditionally, alimony has been used to provide the necessities of
life, including food, clothing and shelter.5 Additionally, it has been de-
manded for reasonable transportation expenses, medical and drug ex-
penses, household expenses and income tax liability generated by support
" See 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 39, § 15, at 83 ("Alimony is becoming obsolete and is being
supplanted by support or maintenance.").
5o W. STATSKY, DOMESTIC RELATIONS: LAW AND SKILLS 265 (1978). As a result of the decision
handed down by the United States Supreme Court in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), it is
unconstitutional for state statutes to grant alimony to wives but not to husbands. Such
statutes must be gender neutral in order to be valid. Id. at 82-83.
5- 440 U.S. 268 (1979). See generally W. O'DONNELL & D. JONES, THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND
MARITAL ALTERNATIVES 158 (1982) (discussing Orr and gender-neutral laws).
" See Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 19 FAM. L.Q. 331, 369
(1986).
" See 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 39, § 15. See also O'Neill v. O'Neill, 164 Neb. 674, 83 N.W.2d
92 (1957); Rubin v. Rubin, 284 App. Div. 76, 130 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1st Dep't 1954).
See W. O'DONNELL & D. JONES, supra note 51, at 156 (describing three varieties of
alimony).
' See generally H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 3.4, at 133 (1968) (majority of jurisdictions do
not allow permanent alimony without statutory authority).
"0 See Ward v. Ward, 332 So. 2d 868, 872 (La. Ct. App. 1976), modified, 339 So. 2d 839 (La.
1986) (reversed, insofar as rejected alimony to wife on basis of insufficient earning capacity).
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payments. 57 Sometimes alimony has been awarded in an amount suffi-
cient to allow the supported spouse to continue the lifestyle to which such
spouse was accustomed during the marriage. Many states award rehabili-
tative alimony, whereby alimony or maintenance is awarded for a specific
and limited period of time. This is done, theoretically, to assist the receiv-
ing spouse in achieving a position of equality or self-sufficiency with re-
spect to earning capacity as compared with the paying spouse. 8 Cur-
rently, there is significant debate over the application of rehabilitative
alimony; whether it is appropriate instead of permanent alimony and, if
appropriate, when and under what conditions it should be awarded. 9
II. PERMANENT ALIMONY: ITS CURRENT PURPOSE, FUNCTION AND
MEASURE
The opportunity to obtain alimony is directly provided for in all
states of the Union, except Texas. Texas is the only state which does not
provide for permanent or rehabilitative alimony upon dissolution." None-
theless, it would be inaccurate to state that in Texas one spouse will not
be obliged to provide funds for the care and support of another spouse
upon the dissolution of a marriage. Parties to a dissolution proceeding in
Texas have only two options; they can either effect a property settlement
agreement or have the court divide their marital property." A property
settlement may provide one party with funds for future support. The
Texas Supreme Court has held, however, that a contractual obligation to
make future payments for support is not alimony.2 The agreement will
have whatever legal force the law of contracts will give to it and only
contravenes state policy when ordered by a court pursuant to a final de-
cree of divorce." In another decision, a Texas Court of Appeals held that
'7 See Moss v. Moss, 379 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (alimony includes reasonable
and necessary expenses beyond basic necessities).
" See Note, Rehabilitative Alimony: An Old Wolf in New Clothes, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 667 (1984-85). States which award so-called rehabilitative alimony include: Arizona,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennes-
see, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin. California denominates its awards rehabilitative
spousal support. Id. at 667 n.4. See, e.g., Reback v. Reback, 296 So. 2d 541 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974) (definition of rehabilitative alimony), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1975);
Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (same).
" See Note, supra note 58.
60 See Freed & Walker, supra note 52, at 369.
" See Comment, Permanent Alimony-Disguised in Property Settlement Agreements, 11
S. TEx. L.J. 269 (1969). It.is noted that enveloping alimony within property division is inter-
esting, in light of the fact that Texas is a community property state. Id.
62 Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 1967). See Comment, supra note 61, at 270.
63 See Comment, supra note 61, at 276.
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a trial court may require one party to make monetary payments to the
other after divorce, as long as the payments are referable to rights and
equities of the parties and to the matrimonial properties at time of disso-
lution of the marriage." Moreover, payments may be ordered to be made
from a spouse's separate, personal property. These payments will not be
considered alimony.65
Although the function of alimony has traditionally been to provide
for the receiving spouse's needs to the extent the other spouse has the
ability to pay,6" a question still arousing debate is whether the function of
alimony should be to allow the receiving spouse to live in the lifestyle to
which he or she was accustomed during the marriage.67 A related debate
concerns whether alimony should compensate the receiving spouse to the
degree that he or she merits compensation for non-monetary contribu-
tions to the family and other spouse during the marriage. Provision for
necessities of life undeniably forms part of the alimony function, but it is
appropriate to ask whether more is required; whether alimony should
play an equalizing role for the parties to a marriage. Should alimony be
the mechanism which enables parties to exit the marriage on equal mone-
tary footing, aware that all contributions to the marriage merit recogni-
tion and monetary reward? The simple fact that one party has contrib-
uted to the marriage and the family by caring for the home, rearing the
children and supporting the money-making endeavors and career devel-
opment of the other spouse indicates that this party should not be mone-
tarily disadvantaged when the marriage dissolves. This view certainly has
merit if society really wishes to promote the traditional family, the value
of child rearing, and freedom of choice within the family.
The determination whether to grant or deny permanent alimony, as
well as the amount and duration, are matters that rest within the broad
discretion of the trial court. Over half of the states have promulgated
statutory guidelines or factors68 to assist the trial court in reaching a de-
" Price v. Price, 591 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
" See id. at 604. See, e.g., Musslewhite v. Musslewhite, 555 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (in divorce proceeding, court may award substantial portion of other spouse's separate
personal property when necessary to effect fair and just division) (citing Trader v. Trader,
531 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)).
66 See 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 39, § 15, at 21. See also Alibrando v. Alibrando, 375 A.2d 9,
13 (D.C. 1977) (wife's needs and husband's ability to contribute factored into alimony
award); Taylor v. Taylor, 378 So. 2d 1352, 1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (needs of one
spouse are met by alimony award to the extent the other spouse is able to pay).
67 See Freed & Walker, supra note 52, at 370.
" New York has promulgated an elaborate scheme, which includes formulae or factors for
property division, maintenance, and child support. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKin-
ney 1986 & Supp. 1988). See also Freed & Walker, supra note 52, at 361-64 (enumeration of
common statutory guidelines and listing of states with such guidelines).
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termination. The relevant criteria include: the length of the marriage;6 9
the age, physical condition and emotional health of the parties;7 0 the dis-
tribution of the property;" the education level of the parties at the time
of marriage and at the time that the action is commenced;7 1 the home-
maker services and contributions to the career or career potential of the
other party by the party seeking alimony;73 the earning capacity of the
party seeking alimony (which involves an evaluation of educational back-
ground, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence
from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children);7 4 and the
possibility that the party seeking alimony can become self-supporting at a
standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the mar-
riage.7 5 Other guidelines include: the tax consequences to each party;
7 6
any agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage; 77 the
needs of the potential recipient and the ability of the potential obligor to
meet his own needs and financial obligations while meeting those of the
recipient;" the financial resources of each party;79 and any other relevant
factors that the court deems just and equitable.80 Sometimes fault or
marital misconduct which is sufficient to constitute a cause for dissolution
is a bar to alimony or a factor to be considered. It is notable that statu-
tory guidelines speak very specifically about the health care of the spouse
*. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 25-319 (Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-82 (1987).
70 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319 (Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-114
(1987).
" See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-709 (1984) (focus upon sufficiency of property to provide for
party's reasonable needs); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.5 (1985) (alimony shall be in amount as
circumstances render, having due regard to the estates).
71 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-82 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11 (Burns 1987).
71 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801 (West Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (West 1985).
71 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08 (West 1985) (statute considers time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable party to find employment); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 208, § 34 (West 1987) (statutory language mentions vocational skills and employability
of party seeking maintenance).
75 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 30.209 (Harrison Supp. 1986) (jury may grant alimony and may
consider standard of living as a factor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.5 (1985) (standard of living
to which parties are accustomed is a factor in determining alimony).
76 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101 (1987).
77 See, e.g., MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-106 (1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.26 (West 1981).
78 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1985); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.200 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1984).
'9 See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson Supp. 1987) (court considers retire-
ment benefits, expectancies, inheritances and property brought into the marriage); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-5-101 (1987) (includes income from pension, profit sharing and retirement
benefits).
SO See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-5-101 (1987); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-15 (1986).
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and/or children.-1 No one state has provided an all-inclusive statute. In
addition, despite the statutory guidelines, judicial discretion is still ex-
tremely broad because the factors are not generally weighted in terms of
impact or importance. Some courts have complained that there are so
many factors available for consideration that it is possible to "[s]upport
. . . absolutely any argument or position one wants to pursue."''" Indeed,
little is known about the standards that are actually applied by trial
judges in making alimony decisions.8" Notwithstanding this uncertainty, a
trial judge's decision may not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous, an
abuse of discretion or unsupported by sufficient evidence.8 It has been
noted by Professors Weitzman and Dixon that, typically, alimony is
awarded on the basis of the attorneys' (in negotiated settlements) or
judges' perceptions of what the husband can afford. Judges often feel
compelled to place an equal burden "on men and women whose position
and capacity for support are, by virtue of their experiences in marriage,
typically unequal."86 This raises doubt as to the validity of past and cur-
rent legal evaluations of spouses' relative monetary positions during and
after dissolution and forces a question regarding the appropriate response
for the future. It is clear that the current approach has impoverished mil-
lions of mothers and children. 6 Finally, it is interesting to note that, al-
0' CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-85 (1987) (order for support of mentally ill spouse which may be
set aside or altered by said court); IND. CODE. ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11(e)(1) (West Supp. 1987)
("[i]f the court finds a spouse to be physically or mentally incapacitated to the extent that
the ability of the incapacitated spouse to support himself is materially affected, [the support
during this period of incapacity is] subject to further order of the court").
8" Rogers v. Rogers, 49 OKLA. B.A.J. 492-496 (Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1978). "(Ajttorneys search
the cases for only those criteria most favorable to their side . . . and ignore the rest. The
trial bench, the bar, and the litigants, more often than not, after considering these criteria,
are still left in the dark as to what the ultimate award of alimony will be, if indeed any is
given at all." Id. at 496.
8" See FOOTE, LEVY & SANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 681 (3d ed. 1985).
84 See Colabianchi v. Colabianchi, 646 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (review of trial
court's decision on alimony is limited to abuse of discretion); Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d
30, 32 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) (trial court decision will be sustained, "unless there is no sub-
stantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it
erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law."). See also Kraus-
koph, Maintenance: A Decade of Development, 50 Mo. L. REV. 259, 262-63 (1985) (discuss-
ing trial court's broad discretion in granting maintenance awards).
8" Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference?, 14
FAM. L.Q. 141, 184-85 (1980) (emphasis omitted). See L. WErrZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLU-
TION (1985) (divorced woman and their children suffer an immediate 74% decrease in their
standard of living, while their ex-husbands enjoy a 42% increase). See generally Weitzman,
The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and
Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181 (1981) [hereinafter Weitzman, The Econom-
ics of Divorce].
88 The staggering proportions of this impoverishment are graphically manifest in Bruch &
Wikler, The Economic Consequences, in Special Issue on Child Support Enforcement, 36
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though all states but one provide for alimony, it appears that alimony is
not, in reality, awarded in most divorces.8 7 Furthermore, when it is
awarded, it is not awarded in excessive amounts.8 "
III. ALIMONY FOR A SPECIFIC TERM
When post-decretal alimony is granted, some states allow a limitation
on the amount of time that the receiving spouse will be supported. This
approach, known as rehabilitative alimony, has been widely utilized in
past years.8 9 For example, in 1971, Florida promulgated its Dissolution of
Marriage Act,90 implementing the notion of rehabilitative alimony. The
popularity of rehabilitative alimony increased significantly throughout
the country in conjunction with the advent of no-fault divorce and equi-
table property distribution."'
The articulated goal of limiting the duration of alimony is to en-
courage the recipient spouse to become self-supporting and to give such
spouse "a sense of independence and psychological fulfillment." 92 More-
over, it has been argued that some of the attendant financial problems of
divorce may be alleviated by this device. It has been stated that rehabili-
tative alimony "contemplates sums necessary to assist a divorced person
in regaining a useful and constructive role in society through vocational
or therapeutic training or retraining and for the further purpose of
preventing financial hardship on society or individuals during the rehabil-
itative process."9 " The very idea of a need for "rehabilitation" or "ther-
Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 5 (1985). See also Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce, supra note 85, at
1249 (discussion of impoverishment of women and children).
87 See H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW 485 (2d ed. 1984).
" See H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.1, at 422.
88 Note, supra note 58, at 667 n.4.
90 FLA. STAT. § 61 (1983). Florida courts have granted rehabilitative alimony in cases where
there is a strong chance that the dependant spouse will return to a state of self-sufficiency.
See Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269, 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (rehabilitative alimony
granted to a 48 year old woman with demonstrated capacity for gainful employment); but
see Kalmutz v. Kalmutz, 299 So. 2d 30, 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (rehabilitative alimony
improper where 45-year-old-woman incapable of working except for a short period in which
she worked for her husband). See generally Comment, Rehabilitative Alimony-A Matter
of Discretion or Direction?, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 285 (1984).
9' See Gillman, Alimony/Spousal Support: From Punishment to Rehabilitation, 7 CoMMU-
NITY PROP. J. 135, 135 (1980); Note, supra note 58, at 676.
" Molnar v. Molnar, 314 S.E.2d 73, 76 (W. Va. 1984). See also Luff v. Luff, 329 S.E.2d 100,
102 (W. Va. 1985) (to obtain extension of rehabilitative alimony receiving spouse must show
expectation of rehabilitation has not been realized).
91 See Note, supra note 58, at 667-68 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157 (5th ed.
1979)); Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); see also Reback v.
Reback, 296 So. 2d 541, 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (illustrative of common usage and ordinary
definition of term rehabilitation), cert. denied, 312 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974).
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apy" to help a recipient spouse regain a useful role in society when ap-
plied to a spouse who has spent her life rearing the couple's children and
caring for their home suggests disrespect and some institutionalized hy-
pocrisy regarding reverence for the family and the homemaker.
There is, however, an appropriate justification for rehabilitative ali-
mony. In addition to the equitable division of property, the paying spouse
ought to pay maintenance to provide the receiving spouse with compensa-
tion for her expenditure of "human capital" for the benefit of the family
and for her sacrifice with respect to career development and earning ca-
pacity."" It is significant that the alimony award should be in addition to
equitable property division. This would allow both parties to make a
"clean break." Where the marriage has been one of short duration and
children are not involved, there may be little need for long-term compen-
sation. In such cases, rehabilitative alimony is appropriate. The proper
function of the court is to allow the parties to exit the marriage on a
relatively equal financial footing.
If there is a danger related to rehabilitative alimony, it is not based
on its essential concept but, rather, on its misapplication. Commentators
have suggested that, in practice, rehabilitative alimony is not serving the
appropriate theoretical purpose. It has been opined that some trial courts
have utilized short-term alimony simply as a time-limiting device and as
a substitute for equitable property division." Hence, it adds to the im-
poverishment of women when applied to those who have devoted many
years to their families and to homemaking; to those who are divorced af-
ter marriages of long duration; and to those who, because of their age and
level of experience, will have a difficult time attaining economic self-suffi-
ciency.9 Thus, while rehabilitative alimony is conceptually sound, "flexi-
ble standards and broad judicial discretion [have] allow[ed] . . . the eco-
nomic contributions of women to be undervalued or ignored."97
The appropriate use of rehabilitative alimony would be to limit its
application to situations where the receiving spouse has a realistic oppor-
tunity to reach a comparable level of economic development. Rehabilita-
tive alimony would be proper in situations where a younger spouse has
entered into marriage with marketable skills which have deteriorated
" See Note, supra note 58, at 668-69. See also Freed & Foster, Economic Effects of Di-
vorce, 7 FAM. L.Q. 275, 277-78 (1973) (trend toward regarding alimony or "maintenance" as
supplemental to distribution of marital property).
" See Note, supra note 58, at 668.
See In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 453, 573 P.2d 41, 52, 143 Cal. Rptr. 139,
150 (1978).
" Note, supra note 58, at 669. See generally L. WErrZMAN, supra note 85; Weitzman, The
Economics of Divorce, supra note 85, at 1235-41 (women experience a greater decline in
standard of living following divorce due to judicial difficulty in evaluating child-rearing con-
tributions and in light of inadequate child support).
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through non-use, or where the recipient spouse has otherwise evinced a
potential for self-support and the capabilities could be developed or
redeveloped through training or academic study. In these circumstances,
an award of alimony for a limited period of time would provide an oppor-
tunity to refurbish old skills or to acquire new ones.' 8 Once again, it is
emphasized that such alimony should be awarded in addition to an equi-
table property division. Short-term alimony generally should not be
granted to older spouses, to those who have been in marriages of long
duration or where a spouse will never be able to achieve the standard of
living which her ex-spouse enjoys-a standard which she helped him to
achieve. Some courts have recognized these principles. 99
Various means have been utilized to implement time-limited ali-
mony. A number of jurisdictions provide for it statutorily by authorizing
consideration of the employment potential of a dependent spouse; the
length of the marriage; the age, health and skills of the dependent spouse;
and any other relevant economic factors which are normally considered
for permanent alimony.'" Some courts have upheld awards of rehabilita-
tive alimony under their general alimony statutes, concluding that these
statutes confer powers broad enough to fashion such awards. They have
reasoned that unless the statute specifically prohibits rehabilitative ali-
mony, its breadth encompasses the right to award it."'O Broad discretion,
while important and valuable, is subject to abuse. Decisions awarding re-
habilitative alimony to older spouses or those who have sacrificed their
careers for the sake of the family should be closely scrutinized.
IV. ALIMONY AND THE PROFESSIONAL LICENSE OR DEGREE
Some jurisdictions have allowed consideration of one spouse's contri-
butions which had enabled the other spouse to obtain a professional de-
gree or license in their computation of alimony awards. For example, a
Wisconsin court allowed the valuation of the contribution of one spouse
to the other's training, education and increased earning power.'0 2 The val-
99 See Molnar v. Molnar, 314 S.E.2d 73, 74 (W. Va. 1984). Cf. Oviatt v. Oviatt, 355 N.W.2d
825, 827 (N.D. 1984) (rehabilitative alimony is appropriate for party disadvantaged after a
marriage of short duration).
See Holston v. Holston, 58 Md. App. 308, 473 A.2d 459 (1984).
,'0 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319 (Supp. 1987); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801 (West Supp.
1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-47 (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 504 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-203 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (1983); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 107.105 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 501 (Purdon Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. § 25-4-41 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 752 (Supp. 1987); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
767.26 (West 1981).
o' Molnar, 314 S.E.2d at 77.
In re Marriage of Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 318 N.W.2d 918, 925 (1982) (majority
allowed for such contribution in a maintenance award, pursuant to Wisconsin statute which
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uation has often been based on the amount that the degree or license
actually cost (tuition, expenses, books). Sometimes it has been limited to
those costs and granted only to spouses who worked to pay those costs.
Most persons would admit that a degree or license is worth more than the
expenses that went into its achievement. Therefore, even if the receiving
spouse would receive restitution for the cost of the degree, treating the
additional value of the degree as a gift to the other spouse would result in
the unjust enrichment of this other spouse.103
Consequently, the degree or license must be valued in light of some
standard. The Michigan Court of Appeals has stated that the following
factors must be considered: the length of the marriage after the degree
was obtained; the source and extent of the financial support provided by
the non-degree earning spouse during the years that the degree was
earned; and the division of the other marital property.104 This standard
does not explicitly take into account the non-monetary contributions
made by the non-degree earning spouse. It appears to be morally, concep-
tually, and practically appropriate to recognize a spouse's contribution to
the other spouse's career development and professional or other educa-
tional degree. Monetary and non-monetary contributions should be recog-
nized as factors in determining the amount of alimony.
It has been suggested that a better way to recognize the contribution
to a degree or license would be in the equitable division of property,
rather than in the alimony award.10 5 Otherwise, the spouse who contrib-
uted to the family would lose the economic recognition of that contribu-
allowed trial courts to consider contribution of spouse to "education, training or increased
earning power of the other").
101 See Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 268, 337 N.W.2d 332, 337 (1983).
' Id. at 269, 337 N.W.2d at 337.
100 See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985) (plain-
tiff's medical license constitutes "marital property" pursuant to New York Domestic Rela-
tions Law § 236(B)(1)(c) (McKinney 1986)). "[Olur statute recognizes that spouses have an
equitable claim to things of value arising out of the marital relationship." Id. at 583, 489
N.E.2d at 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746. See also In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 767-
68, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354, 356-57, 691 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1984) (case remanded for decision under
the new California Civil Code § 4800.3, which provides that community property contribu-
tions to the education of one spouse are to be reimbursed); Scott v. Scott, 645 S.W.2d 193,
197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (spouse's contribution toward the other's professional degree may
be taken into account in equitable distribution of property); In re Marriage of Newhaus, 9
Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2168 (Wash. 1982) (dental license is community property). Contra In
re Marriage of Weinstein, 128 Ill. App. 3d 234, 244, 470 N.E.2d 551, 559 (1984) (degree not
marital property); Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich. App. 404, 410, 354 N.W.2d 359, 361-62 (1984)
(medical degree is not property subject to distribution, but rehabilitative alimony is availa-
ble). See generally Freed & Walker, supra note 52, at 376-79 (decisions discussed and chart
indicating recognition of contribution to professional degree); Krauskoph, Recompense for
Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capi-
tal, 28 U. KAN. L. REv. 379, 382-84 (1980) (discussion of valuation of degree).
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tion if she were to remarry or if the other spouse were to die. On the
other hand, considering the degree or license to be marital property sug-
gests that if it were earned and paid for prior to marriage, it is separate
property. If this were the case, earnings based on the degree, even during
marriage, would be considered separate property. No portion of property
generated by the degree, which may well be everything, would be divisible
at divorce. To avoid this inequity, it would be better to consider all con-
tributions made by both spouses to the family and to determine alimony
based upon a portion of the paying spouse's income.'0 6 Professor Krause
has suggested that the legislative emphasis should shift away from classi-
fying all post-marital payments as either alimony or property. Instead,
new classifications that satisfy societal and individual needs should be
created. 10 7 Included in these classifications should be solutions to the
problems concerning rights to the professional degree or license.
V. FAULT AND THE DETERMINATION OF ALIMONY
Fault and its impact on alimony has been a durable and abiding phe-
nomenon. The rationale behind fault influencing alimony is that the
party to the marriage whose misconduct caused the dissolution should
not be allowed to receive payment for these misdeeds.0 8 Today, only a
minority of states still retain fault or marital misconduct as a statutory
consideration in awarding alimony. 0 9 Alimony statutes may be divided
into several categories: those which bar alimony when the party seeking
alimony is guilty of fault or marital misconduct;1 0 those which expressly
state that fault or marital misconduct shall or may be considered as a
factor in granting alimony;. 1 those which allow consideration of economic
I"0 See H. KRAUSE, 1986 SUPPLEMENT TO FAMILY LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 81 (2d ed.
1986).
107 See H. KRAUSE, 1986 SUPPLEMENT TO FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 84
(1986) [hereinafter KRAUSE, QUESTIONS SUPPLEMENT].
108 See, e.g., Swanson v. Swanson, 233 Minn. 354, 360, 46 N.W.2d 878, 882 (1951) (court
noted that "[it] does not seem likely that marital harmony will be promoted if a wife may
drive her husband from her without prejudice to her claim for alimony and property.").
100 See infra notes 110 & 111.
110 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 30-201 (Harrison 1981) (if preponderance of evidence estab-
lishes adultery by party seeking alimony no award); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 160 (West Supp.
1988) (alimony awarded provided "spouse has not been at fault"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
16.6(a) (1984) (alimony not payable when adultery is committed by party seeking alimony);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (Law Co-op. 1976) (no alimony granted to adulterous spouse); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-107.1 (Cumin. Supp. 1987) (no permanent alimony awarded to spouse who
committed adultery, has been a convicted felon, or has been guilty of cruelty or desertion);
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15(i) (1986) (same).
I See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-2-52 (1975) (misconduct may be considered); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46b-82 (1987) (causes for the annulment shall be considered); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.08(1)
(West 1985) (adultery of alimony-seeking spouse may be considered); HAW. REV. STAT. §
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misconduct;... those which expressly exclude marital fault as a considera-
tion in awarding alimony;" 13 and those which do not mention fault at all.
Judicial interpretation of these indifferent statutes has been mixed, with
some allowing the consideration of fault"4 and some refusing to do so.""In the past, the use of fault was one of the mechanisms whereby hus-
bands were able to avoid paying alimony. When a finding of fault was
necessary to attain a dissolution of marriage, it was found-often con-
trived-and animosity was exacerbated."' As "no-fault" divorce became
possible, many felt that it was inappropriate to consider fault in relation
to the question of alimony. If fault existed, it was argued, the likelihood is
that both parties contributed their share. If one ex-spouse is in need after
the dissolution, the other should continue to support her, as long as he
has the ability and capacity to do so. Whether the obligation to pay ali-
mony is seen as either a continuation of the marital support obligation or
as a method of ensuring equal economic status of two ex-partners who
have equally contributed to the marital relationship, fault is seen as hav-
ing no place in the alimony determination according to those states which
have abolished its consideration.
580-47(a) (1985 & Supp. 1987) ("respective merits" of parties shall be considered); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 501(b)(14) (Purdon Supp. 1987-88) ("marital misconduct" shall be consid-
ered); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-101(d)(10) (Supp. 1987) ("relative fault" of parties shall be
considered in court's discretion).
"' Economic considerations are often illustrated in calculating the amount of the alimony
award. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-319(B)(7) (Supp. 1987) (the extent to which
spouse seeking maintenance has reduced potential income shall be taken into account); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 61.08(2) (West 1985) (court shall consider all "relevant economic factors" in
determining alimony or maintenance award); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6) (McKinney
1986) ("court shall consider . . . (9) the wasteful dissipation of marital property by either
spouse").
"I See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308, 9A U.L.A. 347-48 (1987) [hereinafter
UNIFORM ACT] (award of maintenance "in amounts and for periods of time the court deems
just, without regard to marital misconduct."); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.160 (1983) (court may
provide for maintenance and division of property without regard to fault); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-319(B) (Supp. 1987) (marital misconduct irrelevant in determination of mainte-
nance); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4509 (Deering 1984) ("evidence of specific acts of misconduct shall
be improper and inadmissible, except where child custody is in issue and such evidence is
relevant to that issue"); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-114 (1987) (marital misconduct irrelevant
to maintenance award). See generally Freed & Walker, supra note 52 (discussing states
which do not consider fault a factor).
14 See, e.g., Arnholt v. Arnholt, 129 Mich. App. 810, 814, 343 N.W.2d 214, 216 (1983) (rela-
tive fault of parties may be considered in determining alimony awards); Peterson v. Peter-
son, 308 Minn. 365, 373, 242 N.W.2d 103, 108 (1976) (en banc) (in proper circumstances
marital misconduct relevant under no-fault divorce laws).
"I See, e.g., In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Iowa 1972) (no-fault law
requires no consideration of fault in alimony determination). Cf. Boyd v. Boyd, 421 A.2d
1356 (Me. 1980) (no-fault law eliminates fault from affecting property distribution).
I See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 113, 9A U.L.A. at 148 (prefatory note).
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It might be wise to allow proof of only egregious fault by one of the
parties." 7 The cost of allowing such an exception, however, is that disso-
lution actions might degenerate into what they were before "no-fault" di-
vorces. Unfortunately, the facts of some cases indicate that allowing this
proof might be worth the risk. For example, a psychiatrist apparently
tried to hire a "hit man" to kill his wife. He was unsuccessful, although
his conduct did prompt a divorce action in which he sought $120,000 per
year tax-free as alimony. 18 In another case, a woman received past due
temporary alimony and a property settlement of $250,000 after serving
nineteen months in prison for attempting to hire someone to kill her hus-
band." 9 Such flagrant cases demonstrate that perhaps extreme miscon-
duct should be relevant to the awarding of alimony. However, this egre-
gious fault exception should be limited to extreme instances and should
require a very high standard of proof.
VI. MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION OF ALIMONY AWARDS
Alimony awards are generally modifiable upon proof that circum-
stances have changed materially and substantially such that the modifica-
tion is just and equitable. 20 In addition, they typically terminate upon
the death of either party or the remarriage of the receiving spouse. The
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act requires that the change in circum-
stances be so substantial that it would be "unconscionable" to continue
,7 See Lynn v. Lynn, 165 N.J. Super. 328, 337, 398 A.2d 141, 144-45 (App. Div.) (egregious
marital fault might equitably preclude right to claim alimony), certification denied, 81 N.J.
52, 404 A.2d 1152 (1979).
.. D'Arc v. D'Arc, 164 N.J. Super. 226, 232, 395 A.2d 1270, 1274 (Ch. Div. 1978), afl'd, 175
N.J. Super. 598, 421 A.2d 602 (App. Div.), certification denied, 85 N.J. 487, 427 A.2d 579
(1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
Popeil v. Popeil, 2 Faro. L. Rep. (BNA) 2601 (1976).
120 See, e.g., Sanchione v. Sanchione, 173 Conn. 397, 407, 378 A.2d 522, 527 (1977) (modifi-
cation only when substantial change in circumstances of either party); Olsen v. Olsen, 98
Idaho 10, 11, 557 P.2d 604, 605 (1976) ("moving party has the burden of establishing a
material, permanent and substantial change in circumstances"); Smith v. Smith, 73 Ill. App.
3d 423, 426, 392 N.E.2d 292, 295 (1979) (modification only upon showing of change in cir-
cumstances). See generally H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 6.4, at 199 (discussing modification).
On the other hand, property division is not modifiable, and extended property division
payments do not terminate at the death or remarriage of the parties. But see NEv. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 125.150(6) (Michie 1986) (when court adjudicates property rights, whether or
not jurisdiction is retained to modify, property rights may be modified by court).
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alimony as it was. 2' Statutes often specifically authorize modification 22
and termination of alimony awards.""3
Even without statutory authorization, trial courts have the power to
modify or terminate spousal support. Generally, however, this power ex-
ists only if the court had initially ordered the payment of alimony and
only if the court reserved its jurisdiction when it granted the divorce and
awarded the alimony. 24 A court that has failed to retain jurisdiction is
theoretically without power to modify or terminate the support. 2 ' In at
least one state which requires reservation of jurisdiction to modify, failure
to expressly reserve jurisdiction has been regarded as a mere clerical error
when the tenor of the judgment itself had clearly indicated the court's
intention to retain jurisdiction. 2" Moreover, in a "lengthy marriage," it
has been held an abuse of discretion to refuse to retain jurisdiction.'2 7
Jurisdiction should be reserved unless the record "clearly ' indicates that
the receiving spouse will be adequately provided for by the amount
awarded. 2 8
121 See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 113, § 316, 9A U.L.A. at 489-90. Modifications are only
allowed for installments accruing subsequent to the motion to modify. See id. § 316(a), 9A
U.L.A. at 489.
"I' See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801(a) (Deering Supp. 1987) (court may modify or revoke
support order if deems necessary); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-86(a) (West Supp. 1988)
("substantial change" in circumstances allows modification); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para.
510(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b)(2) (Supp. 1984) (de-
cree can provide for modification or party can seek hearing to modify future installments);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 37 (West 1987) (either party may move for modification).
, See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801(b) (Deering Supp. 1987) (support terminates at death of
either party or remarriage of recipient spouse); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510(b) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1987) (terminates upon death of either party, remarriage of recipient spouse, or
if recipient spouse cohabitates with another person); N.Y. DOM. RmL. LAW § 236 (McKinney
1986) (termination by death of either party or remarriage of recipient spouse); UNIFORM
ACT, supra note 113, § 316(b), 9A U.L.A. at 490 (same).
" See, e.g., C. MARKEY, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 21.60, at 21-78
(1984).
" See Cochran v. Cochran, 13 Cal. App. 3d 339, 344, 91 Cal. Rptr. 630, 632 (1970).
... See In re Marriage of Sheridan, 140 Cal. App. 3d 742, 746, 189 Cal. Rptr. 622, 624
(1983); C. MARKEY, supra note 124, § 21.62(2), at 21-82.
... See In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 454, 573 P.2d 41, 52, 143 Cal. Rptr. 139,
150 (1978); In re Marriage of Norton, 71 Cal. App. 3d 537, 539-40, 139 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730
(1976).
1.. In re Marriage of Vomacka, 36 Cal. 3d 459, 467, 683 P.2d 248, 253, 204 Cal. Rptr. 568,
573 (1984) (where there is ambiguity regarding termination of support, strong policy favor-
ing retention of jurisdiction exists (citing In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 573
P.2d 41, 143 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1978))). See also In re Iverson, 12 Fan. L. Rep. (BNA) 1067
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 1985) (implicitly retained as original award did not explicitly termi-
nate jurisdiction); In re Marriage of Morrison, 20 Cal. 3d 437, 453, 573 P.2d 41, 52, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 139, 150 (1978) (jurisdiction retained so as to ensure that "common-sense, basic de-
cency and simple justice" are carried out (quoting In re Marriage of Brantner, 67 Cal. App.
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In personam jurisdiction is required to modify an alimony decree,
just as it is for the initial award of alimony. Modification of foreign ali-
mony awards is generally possible as long as the court ordering modifica-
tion has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. 29 Addition-
ally, if the petition for modification concerns a foreign alimony decree
and if the court has in personam jurisdiction over both parties, then a
choice of law problem arises.'"0 A party seeking modification of an ali-
mony decree must file a motion or petition with the appropriate court
and give reasonable notice to the adverse party. The date of the notice of
motion or the order to show cause why modification or termination
should not occur is instrumental in that many jurisdictions allow modifi-
cation only for future installments. Relief to the petitioning party will be
granted only as to the amount of alimony which is due subsequent to the
filing date of the motion'' because the court's order will not be retroac-
tive. Any amount of money which has accrued before the filing of such
motion, and which is still owed will not be modified or revoked.' Other
jurisdictions allow modification of both accrued and future alimony in-
stallments unless the decree or amount is judicially rendered non-
modifiable.'33
3d 416, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1977))).
129 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 37 (West 1987) (can modify foreign decree to
extent modifiable in foreign jurisdiction). In Bohner v. Bohner, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 545, 468
N.E.2d 653, review denied, 393 Mass. 1102, 470 N.E.2d 798 (1984), the court held that this
statute did not counter substantial rights, but was remedial in nature. See also CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) ("A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any
basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.").
SO See, e.g., Petersen v. Petersen, 24 Cal. App. 3d 201, 205, 100 Cal. Rptr. 822, 824 (1972)
(California's view of changed circumstances applied in a choice of law question on modifica-
tion). See generally E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 15.33-15.38, at 514-20 (1982)
(discussing conflict of laws choices in enforcement and modification); R. WEINTRAUB, COM-
MENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 5.2E, at 248-57 (3d ed. 1986) (jurisdictional require-
ments for decrees); Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L.
REV. 521 (1983) (reviewing choice of law theories).
"I See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801(a) (Deering Supp. 1987) (modification can be granted retroac-
tively until date motion filed); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)
(only subsequently accruing installments can be modified provided due notice given by mo-
vant and only upon showing of significant change in circumstances); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
1610(b)(2) (Supp. 1984) (future payments may be modifiable or terminable). Where a stat-
ute does not address this issue, case law in most jurisdictions limits modification to future
installments of alimony. See, e.g., Engleman v. Engleman, 145 Colo. 299, 303, 358 P.2d 864,
866 (1961) (en banc) (modifications only take effect in futuro).
' See H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.9, at 454 (without an express provision, majority of
courts refuse to allow modification of accrued installments); Freed & Walker, supra note 52,
at 411. See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.150(7) (Michie 1986) (accrued payments not
subject to modification).
1'" N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1986) (authorizing both prospective and retrospec-
tive modification); id. § 244 (authorizing and providing mechanism to render final and
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The trial court has broad discretion to affect or modify a spousal
support award. The court's decision to modify must be based on the facts
and circumstances of each case. The standard is generally whether cir-
cumstances, with respect to the receiving spouse's financial needs or the
paying spouse's ability to pay, have changed materially and sufficiently
since the original award (or a prior petition for modification) so as to
warrant modification.13 4 A person seeking the reduction of an alimony ob-
ligation must not have voluntarily induced his inability to pay.
135
The court may consider virtually any factor when deciding whether
the circumstances have changed sufficiently to modify or terminate ali-
mony.1' Changes in the needs of the parties and the ability to pay,'
whether the paying spouse is in arrears in alimony payments,'38 cohabita-
tion, '8 9 death, 40 and remarriage"" are commonly considered. Some state
statutes specifically provide that alimony may be modified or terminated
upon the remarriage or cohabitation of the spouse receiving alimony, or
nonmodifiable judgment and amount due).
"I Some statutes which state that showing a change of circumstances gives the court the
power to modify or terminate an award of alimony include: ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.170 (1983);
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801(a) (Deering Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-122(1) (1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 61.14 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220 (Harrison Supp. 1986); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-17 (Burns
1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b)(2) (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 37 (West
1987); Nan. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (1984); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1986); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1289 (West Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (Supp. 1987); and
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(3) (Supp. 1987).
See, e.g., Tydings v. Tydings, 349 A.2d 462, 463 (D.C. 1975) (voluntary or self-inflicted
inability to pay alimony insufficient ground for modification); Ellis v. Ellis, 262 N.W.2d 265,
268 (Iowa 1978) ("defendant cannot voluntarily abandon his employment, reduce his wages,
or by other conduct bring about a reduced income and thereby avoid, or cause the reduction
of, a reasonable support order"); Mazon v. Mazon, 163 Pa. Super. 502, 505, 63 A.2d 112, 114
(1949) (same).
"I H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.9, at 456; C. MARKEY, supra note 124, § 21.63(1). See infra
notes 137-38.
"I See McCann v. McCann, 191 Conn. 447, 464 A.2d 825 (1983) (husband's change in earn-
ings held to constitute unforeseen change in circumstances, allowing modification); Jeppson
v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69 (Utah 1984) (when receiving spouse is able to maintain standard of
living enjoyed during marriage, alimony rightly terminated).
118 See C. MARKEY, supra note 124, § 21.63(3). But see Zirkle v. Zirkle, 304 S.E.2d 664 (W.
Va. 1983) (if failure to pay past alimony'was willful or intentional, court may refuse to hear
petition seeking modification).
... See Bisig v. Bisig, 124 N.H. 372, 375-76, 469 A.2d 1348, 1350 (1983) (cohabitation alone
does not allow automatic modification or termination of alimony because there must be
change in financial circumstances); Gayet v. Gayet, 92 N.J. 149, 153-54, 456 A.2d 102, 104
(1983) (cohabitation one factor in determination of changed circumstances where supported
spouse's financial needs decreased). See also H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.9, at 463; C. MAR-
KEY, supra note 124, § 21.63(4); Freed & Walker, supra note 52, at 410-11.
140 See, e.g., In re Estate of Kuhns, 550 P.2d 816, 817 (Alaska 1976) (obligation to pay
alimony terminates on death of obligor absent contrary provision); In re Marriage of Hayne,
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provide that the court may consider remarriage or cohabitation as one
relevant factor among others which bears upon the decision to modify. 42
Other statutes provide for automatic termination of alimony upon remar-
riage or cohabitation unless the parties have agreed otherwise."3s The gen-
eral rule appears to be that remarriage terminates the obligation to pay
alimony. 44 Some courts have held that even a null remarriage will termi-
nate the alimony obligation.145 Others provide that annulment of the re-
ceiving spouse's remarriage revives a former alimony obligation.' 46
Where the statutes do not specifically provide for modification or ter-
mination because of remarriage, case law so provides. 4 7 The majority po-
sition on cohabitation appears to be that, absent a statute calling for au-
tomatic termination upon proof of cohabitation, the court will modify
alimony if cohabitation has caused a change in the financial needs of the
receiving spouse. 48 A minority of states consider cohabitation to be the
equivalent of marriage for alimony purposes and thus provide for auto-
334 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983) (alimony payments presumed to terminate upon
obligor's death); Clark v. Clark, 601 S.W.2d 614, 615 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (obligation to pay
maintenance terminates upon obligor's death unless express provision otherwise); MacFad-
den v. MacFadden, 46 N.J. Super. 242, 247, 134 A.2d 531, 533 (Ch. Div. 1957) (obligation to
pay terminates upon death of husband), aff'd, 49 N.J. Super. 356, 139 A.2d 774 (App. Div.),
certification denied, 27 N.J. 155, 141 A.2d 828 (1958).
"I' H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.9, at 457, 463; C. MAKE', supra note 124, § 21.63(1)(d).
142 Some statutes which authorize modification of alimony because of remarriage or cohabi-
tation are: CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801.5(a) (Deering 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-220(b) (Harrison
Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1289(D) (West Supp. 1988); and TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-5-101(a)(3) (Supp. 1987).
"' Statutes which authorize the automatic termination of alimony after remarriage or co-
habitation include: CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801(b) (Deering Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 580-
51(a) (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-4-208(4) (1987); and NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.150(5) (Michie 1986).
144 See Bubar v. Plant, 141 Me. 407, 44 A.2d 732 (1945); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 55 Ohio Op. 465,
124 N.E.2d 485 (1955); Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284 (1954).
" See, e.g., Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 876, 291 P.2d 439, 441 (1955) (en banc) (pay-
ing spouse entitled to rely upon supported spouse's remarriage and his alimony obligation
does not "relate back" with respect to annulments). See also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
236(B)(1)(a) (McKinney 1986) ("award of maintenance shall terminate upon... recipient's
valid or invalid marriage").
146 See, e.g., Sutton v. Lieb, 199 F.2d 163, 164-65 (7th Cir. 1952) (purported remarriage by
wife did not release former husband's obligation as void marriage is absolute nullity); Cecil
v. Cecil, 11 Utah 2d 155, 158, 356 P.2d 279, 281 (1960) (as second marriage annulled after
two weeks because of mental capacity, first husband still obligated to support).
... See In re Marriage of Woodward, 229 N.W.2d 274, 280 (Iowa 1975) (remarriage may
require court to terminate alimony); Myhre v. Myhre, 296 N.W.2d 905, 908 (S.D. 1980) (re-
marriage or cohabitation a factor to consider as change of circumstances).
"I See, e.g., Alibrando v. Alibrando, 375 A.2d 9, 14-15 (D.C. 1977) (per curiam) (cohabita-
tion might affect alimony amount). See also 1985 Survey of American Family Law, 11 Fam.
L. Rep. (BNA) 3015, 3018-19 (May 7, 1985) (discussing modification and termination for
cohabitation).
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matic termination. 149 Cohabitation is defined in various terms but gener-
ally means living together "on a resident, continuing conjugal basis."'15 0 In
the event of the death of either the paying spouse or the supported
spouse, statutes or case law permit termination of support unless the
court decree or an agreement between the parties states otherwise.' 5'
When the court makes its decision to modify or terminate alimony, it
must take into consideration any property or marital settlement agree-
ments, court orders or stipulations in open court regarding support of ei-
ther of the parties. 52 If the parties agree in writing or orally in open court
not to modify or terminate, then that agreement controls. The courts will
uphold an agreement not to modify or terminate alimony only if the
agreement expressly states such intentions;' 53 the court will state that it
has the power to modify or terminate alimony if such was not expressly
prohibited.' 5' Furthermore, the court must also determine whether peri-
odic alimony payments in installments were awarded since this situation
" See, e.g., Capper v. Capper, 451 So. 2d 359, 360 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (cohabitation suffi-
cient to terminate alimony).
SO ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, para. 510(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987). See also Northrup v. Nor-
thrup, 43 N.Y.2d 566, 570-71, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 1223, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997, 999 (1978) (habitu-
ally living with a man and holding self out as his wife proof of cohabitation).
" Some of those statutes which expressly state that alimony terminates upon death of the
obligor or either party are: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46-54 (1987) (obligor's death); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.64(3) (West 1969) (death of either party); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.370(2) (Vernon
1987) (death of either party); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208(4) (1987) (death of either party);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150(5) (1986) (death of either party); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (1987)
(death of supported spouse).
"' C. MARKEY, supra note 124, § 21-62.
'13 See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 3 Conn. App. 421, 423, 488 A.2d 1288, 1289 (1985) (where sepa-
ration agreement provided for cessation only upon wife's cohabitation "with an unrelated
male after and for four continuous months in the same residence" court refused to modify
alimony award upon showing of shorter cohabitation period); In re Marriage of Bolstad, 203
Mont. 131, 133, 660 P.2d 95, 97 (1983) (modification by district court in error because prop-
erty settlement agreement expressly precluded modification); In re Rintelman, 115 Wis. 2d
206, 209-10, 339 N.W.2d 612, 614 (1983) (property settlement agreement stating that hus-
band obligated to pay wife alimony for her lifetime not violative of Wisconsin law allowing
for termination of alimony when the supported spouse remarries), aff'd, 118 Wis. 2d 587,
348 N.W.2d 498 (1984). See also Freed & Walker, supra note 52, at 409-11.
'" See, e.g., Bell v. Bell, 393 Mass. 20, 23, 468 N.E.2d 859, 860-61 (1984) (although separa-
tion agreement provisions expressly stated that husband's obligations to pay alimony termi-
nated when wife "liv[es] together with a member of the opposite sex, so as to give the out-
ward appearance of marriage," husband's obligation terminated because wife lived with a
man for three years even though wife and male cohabitant did not hold themselves out as
husband and wife), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027 (1985). But see Collyer v. Proper, 109 App.
Div. 2d 1010, 1011, 486 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (3d Dep't) (husband's motion to terminate ali-
mony payments because wife was cohabitating with another man denied because separation
agreement provided for termination only upon wife's remarriage or if she entered into a
relationship similar to marriage "within the meaning of the Domestic Relations Law [§
248]"), aff'd sub nom. Bliss v. Bliss, 66 N.Y.2d 382, 488 N.E.2d 90, 497 N.Y.S.2d 344 (1985).
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would affect the court's power to modify or terminate the alimony
award.'55
VII. E&FORCEMENT OF ALIMONY AWARDS
There are several methods available to enforce a judgment of support
against the spouse ordered to make payments. Most enforcement vehicles
are designed to operate only after a default has occurred. 5' Enforcement
mechanisms include contempt proceedings, execution, appointment of a
receiver, attachment of the obligor's property, garnishment, wage assign-
ment, income withholding, sequestration (in rare cases) or a lien on the
obligor's property to secure the payment of alimony. Each state provides
its own statutory mechanism for alimony enforcement.
Contempt proceedings have traditionally been utilized as an enforce-
ment mechanism. 16' Contempt has been considered "civil" when the court
uses this mechanism to coerce the spouse to pay, 5' or "criminal" when
the spouse willfully disobeys the order of support.1 9 Notwithstanding the
ventured distinction between civil and criminal contempt, any power to
incarcerate (as punishment or to coerce payment) is at least quasi-crimi-
nal, triggering a due process requirement of notice and opportunity to be
heard.' 60 Most states have statutes which give authorization to find a
' See Freed & Walker, supra note 52, at 408.
Effron, Alimony & Maintenance: The Enforcement Struggle, 8 FAM. Anvoc. 20, 22
(1986).
"' See, e.g., Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 733, 736, 72 P.2d 868, 871 (1937) (en banc)
(courts have power to enforce decrees for alimony by contempt proceedings); Ex parte
Gordon, 95 Cal. 374, 378, 30 P. 561, 562 (1892) (court has power to imprison for willful
contempt); Gonzales v. District Court, 629 P.2d 1074, 1075 (Colo. 1981) (en banc) (court
may enforce orders entered in dissolution of marriage proceeding by contempt). See also
Annotation, Power of Divorce Court, After Child Attained Majority, to Enforce by Con-
tempt Proceedings Payment of Arrears of Child Support, 32 A.L.R.3d 888 (1970).
18 See, e.g., Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 762 (Alaska 1971) ("civil contempt"); Ex parte
Thomas, 406 So. 2d 939, 941 (Ala. 1981) (object of contempt proceeding is to coerce pay-
ment of alimony as decreed, not punishment); Schroeder v. Schroeder, 100 Wis. 2d 625, 639,
302 N.W.2d 475, 482 (1981) (same).
' See, e.g., Stone v. Stidham, 96 Ariz. 235, 237, 393 P.2d 923, 924 (1964) (en banc) ("when
one fails, without good cause, to make the support payments for a former wife as ordered in
a divorce decree, he may be imprisoned for contempt."); Ex parte Lazar, 37 Cal. App. 2d
327, 331-32, 99 P.2d 342, 344 (1940) (order directing payment of alimony, maintenance or
support may be enforced by imprisonment); Thones v. Thones, 185 Tenn. 124, 132, 203
S.W.2d 597, 600 (1947) (policy of state is to punish spouses, who through willful disobedi-
ence refuse to comply with order to pay alimony, even if order is from a sister state). See
also H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.10, at 465.
1 0 See Effron, supra note 156, at 26. See, e.g., Vollindras v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins.
Co., 42 Cal. 2d 149, 153 n.1, 265 P.2d 907, 910 n.1 (1954) (criminal protections accorded even
in contempt proceeding); Raiden v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 83, 86, 206 P.2d 1081, 1902
(1949) (contempt proceedings are criminal in nature with all attendant protections); In re
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spouse in contempt for contumacious refusal to abide by the court's
spousal support order. 6 ' Case law also clearly supports the notion that
courts have the authority to hold the defaulting spouse in contempt.16 2
Imprisonment of a willfully defaulting spouse has been held not to
violate the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. Ali-
mony is not considered to be a debt; it is an obligation imposed upon a
spouse pursuant to a marriage and its dissolution."' A valid assertion of
an unintentional inability to pay is a defense which will prevent impris-
onment.6 However, this defense will not generally eliminate the amount
owed to date since it would have been necessary to obtain a judicial modi-
fication, which is not normally retroactive. " In addition, the contemner
has at least the burden of producing evidence of this inability to pay."'
Martin, 71 Cal. App. 3d 472, 480, 139 Cal. Rptr. 451, 455-56 (1977) (constitutional rights of
defendant must be observed in contempt proceeding).
"I ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 (1983) (attachment for contempt); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 516
(1981) (contempt or attachment of wages); GA. CODE ANN. § 30-204 (1980) (revision of order,
attachment for contempt); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-459 (1981) (civil contempt); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.24 (West 1969) (security, sequestration and contempt); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 245
(McKinney 1986) (fine or committment); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-32-10, 30-3-3 (1977) (con-
tempt); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.29, 767.305 (West 1981) (where wage assignment inapplica-
ble, contempt proceedings available).
""' See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text. See also Cole v. Cole, 67 F. Supp. 134,
136-37 (D.D.C. 1946) (contempt, execution, and sequestration are available to enforce ali-
mony pendente lite), rev'd on other grounds, 161 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Rubin v. Rubin,
418 So. 2d 1065, 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (where husband found to have willfully
failed to make alimony and child support payments despite present ability to pay, can prop-
erly be held in contempt); Fischer v. Fischer, 24 N.J. Super. 180, 183, 93 A.2d 788, 790
(1952) (contempt proceeding for failure to pay alimony), rev'd on other grounds, 13 N.J.
162, 98 A.2d 568 (1953).
1" See Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 453, 35 S.E. 2d 414, 415 (1945) (duty to provide
support is not a debt in legal sense, but an obligation imposed by law, and penal sanctions
are provided for its willful neglect or abandonment); Smith v. Smith, 81 W. Va. 761, 762, 95
S.E. 199, 201 (1918) (alimony is not debt). See also 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation
§ 800 (1983) [hereinafter Divorce And Separation]; H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.10, at 467-
68.
' See, e.g., Sewell v. Butler, 375 So. 2d 800, 801-02 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979) (when alleged
contemner puts evidence of inability to pay, burden is on complainant to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that accused has ability to pay); Messenger v. Messenger, 46 Cal. 2d 619,
629, 297 P.2d 988, 993-94 (1956) (where husband genuinely is without assets, no contempt);
Ex parte Todd, 119 Cal. 57, 58, 50 P. 1071, 1071-72 (1897) (self-rendered inability pay is
generally no defense); In re Spencer, 83 Cal. 460, 465-66, 23 P. 395, 396-97 (1890) (same).
' See, e.g., Kaufmann v. Kaufmann, 246 Ga. 266, 268, 271 S.E.2d 175, 178 (1980) (trial
court in contempt proceeding has no authority to modify an alimony decree); Stanley v.
Stanley, 244 Ga. 417, 417, 260 S.E.2d 328, 329 (1979) (per curiam) (same).
" See, e.g., In re Application of Martin, 76 Idaho 179, 186, 279 P.2d 873, 877 (1955) (court
found ample evidence of contemner's "present ability to pay"); Dalton v. Dalton, 367
S.W.2d 840, 842 (Ky. Ct. App. 1963) (in child support case, contemner must show inability
to pay without fault); Roper v. Roper, 47 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Ky. Ct. App. 1932) (contemner
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Some jurisdictions require that a spouse seeking enforcement of a
support order exhaust other remedies such as execution, a security bond,
a lien or withholding from earnings before seeking enforcement by means
of a contempt order. 16 7 Most, however, regard contempt as a remedy to be
used in conjunction with or in addition to other remedies. 8  A prima fa-
cie case of contempt is established when the obligee spouse files a written
petition alleging that a valid support order has been granted and that the
obligor has defaulted. The establishment of the prima facie case in this
manner triggers the court to issue to the obligor an order to show cause
why attachment or contempt should not follow. Other jurisdictions re-
quire that the obligee spouse present an affidavit alleging all the facts
suggesting contempt. This method will trigger a judicial hearing on the
contempt issue."' 9 Contempt is established upon proof that: a valid judi-
cial order for payments has been issued against the obligor; the obligor
has received legal and appropriate notice; the obligor has had an opportu-
nity to be heard'70 and to assert defenses; "' the obligor has present abil-
ity to comply with the order; 2 and the obligor has willfully disobeyed
the court order or failed to pay. 7 3
must show that inability to pay was not result of own negligence or misconduct); State ex
rel. Casey v. Casey, 175 Or. 328, 337, 153 P.2d 700, 703-04 (1944) (contemner must show
that failure to pay was not willful).
167 See, e.g., Flower v. Flower, 49 A. 158, 159 (N.J. Ch. 1901) (party seeking contempt order
must first exhaust all other remedies); Covello v. Covello, 68 App. Div. 2d 818, 818, 414
N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (1st Dep't 1979) (contempt available, but only where it appears presump-
tively that sequestration, execution or requiring security will fail). See also N.Y. Dom. REL.
LAW § 245 (McKinney 1986) ("[where] it appears presumptively, to the satisfaction of the
court, that payment cannot be enforced pursuant to section two hundred forty-three or two
hundred forty-four of this chapter . . . . [Such order to show cause] may also be made
without any previous sequestration or direction to give security where the court is satisfied
that they would be ineffectual."); Divorce and Separation, supra note 163, § 810, at 791.
I See, e.g., Ginsberg v. Ginsberg 123 So. 2d 57, 59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (there may be
more than one remedy, but only one satisfaction); Lenett v. Lutz, 215 Ga. 369, 370, 110
S.E.2d 628, 629 (1959) (execution and contempt may be concurrently pursued to satisfy
judgment). See also Divorce and Separation, supra note 163, § 810, at 791.
'"9 See supra notes 159-63, 165; infra note 170. See also Divorce and Separation, supra
note 163, § 806, at 785. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Christianson, 89 Ill. App. 3d 167, 174, 411
N.E.2d 519, 525 (1980) (refusal to grant order to show cause why husband should not be
held in contempt was not error when evidence was produced of wife's harassment of
husband.)
10 See Effron, supra note 156, at 26. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 160 and accompanying
text (discussing notice and opportunity to be heard).
171 See supra notes 160, 164-66.
1T* See cases cited supra note 166 and infra note 173.
'" See Ex parte Gerber, 83 Utah 441, 29 P.2d 932 (1934) (in order to convict defendant for
failure to make divorce payments, court must first find that he was able to pay, that he
willfully refused to pay or that he deprived himself of ability to pay); Hillyard v. District
Court, 68 Utah 220, 228-29, 249 P. 806, 809 (1926) (in proceedings for contempt for nonpay-
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When the obligee spouse is receiving public assistance or risks the
need for it, the law may provide that the district attorney or an analogous
public official can proceed with the action to enforce the support order."7 4
On the other hand, some courts have held that the trial court has no
authority to appoint a public defender to represent the alleged contem-
nor. 75 The statute of limitations, 7 ' laches"I and acquiescence by the ob-
ligee spouse are additional defenses to enforcement of alimony decrees. "'
Thus, if the statute of limitations has run, or if the obligee spouse has
delayed enforcement of payments or has agreed to accept a lower amount,
he or she may be barred from recovery. 79 On the other hand, delay in
enforcing a decree due to one obligor's absence from the jurisdiction, pov-
erty or illness of the obligee spouse or other reasonable difficulties will
not bar enforcement.18 0
Execution is another method of enforcement."1 When alimony and
child support payable in installments have accrued, some jurisdictions ,
like California, treat such payments as a judgment for money which al-
ment of alimony, court must find that defendant who was unable to make payments inten-
tionally deprived himself of means of doing so).
171 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4801.7 (Deering 1987).
"' See Shaw v. Provanic, 12 Faro. L. Rep. 1308 (BNA) (Mar. 25, 1986).
170 See, e.g., Bryant v. Bryant, 232 Ga. 160, 163, 205 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1974) (alimony judg-
ments, like all civil judgments are controlled by the statute of limitations); Reffeitt v. Ref-
feitt, 419 N.E.2d 999, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (statute of limitations applies to actions for
child support). Contra Morse v. Zatkiewiez, 5 N.C. App. 242, 245, 168 S.E.2d 219, 222 (1969)
(statute of limitations does not apply to an alimony judgment).
177 See Annotation, Laches and Acquiescence as a Defense, So as to Bar Recovery of Ar-
rearages of Permanent Alimony or Child Support, 5 A.L.R.4th 1015 (1981) [hereinafter
Annotation, Acquiescence as a Defense]. Laches attaches when the obligee spouse forgoes
seeking enforcement of an alimony award for an unreasonable time. See id. at 1022. See,
e.g., Brandt v. Brandt, 276 F.2d 488, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (fourteen years).
18 See Annotation, Acquiescence as a Defense, supra note 177, at 1042; Divorce and Sepa-
ration, supra note 163, § 809, at 791.
17I See Annotation, Acquiescence as a Defense, supra note 177, at 1042.
180 See, e.g., Burke v. Burke, 127 Colo. 257, 262, 255 P.2d 740, 742-43 (1953) (en banc)
(laches did not obtain, despite delay of seventeen years, when whereabouts of ex-husband
were unknown); Renkoff v. Renkoff, 285 App. Div. 876, 877, 137 N.Y.S.2d 428, 429 (1st
Dep't 1955) ("Mere delay of the wife in entering judgment if due to or contributed to by the
absence of the husband from the state would not be sufficient basis for refusing her relief.");
Ross v. Ross, 592 P.2d 600, 603 (Utah 1979) (no laches when ex-husband was in hiding even
though had adopted an assumed name).
181 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 56.29 (West 1987); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 236, 244, 245
(McKinney 1986). Generally, a writ of execution is ordered by the jurisdictional court, di-
recting the sheriff or other designated public official to obtain satisfaction of a judgment.
See Bonner v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 3d 156, 166, 133 Cal. Rptr. 592, 601 (1976) (writ
of execution in dissolution case requires court order); Sutton v. Sutton, 382 So. 2d 776, 777
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (wife entitled to order requiring husband to appear before court
upon sheriff's affidavit showing outstanding, unsatisfied execution of judgment).
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lows execution on the amount in arrears to issue without further proceed-
ings and without notice to the obligor.' 8' Other jurisdictions, including
New York, require the judgment to be docketed for the amount of the
arrears. This requires that notice and opportunity to be heard be afforded
to the obligor. 85 Personal service, however, may not be required as this is
considered to be the continuation of the original divorce proceeding."8 4
After docketing the judgment for arrearage, execution may issue for the
amount due and interest at the statutory rate from the date on which the
payments accrued. 85 When the support obligation is considered to be a
money judgement, the obligee spouse has the status of a judgment credi-
tor and is entitled to all remedies given to such person.180 Execution will
be permitted and will be levied on personal property of the obligor spouse
or, if necessary, on his or her real estate, 7 but only after the installments
have matured and there has been a default.
Attachment of property is another method of enforcing alimony
awards. Some courts require that the property be seized or made subject
to court control before an in rem decree is ordered." 8 Other jurisdictions
do not require attachment of real estate or court'control over the prop-
erty before an alimony judgment is rendered; however, effective notice
must be given.8 9
Another remedy for enforcement of an alimony decree is garnishment
182 See In re Marriage of Sandy, 113 Cal. App. 3d 724, 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 747, 750 (1980);
Simonet v. Simonet, 263 Cal. App. 2d 612, 616, 69 Cal. Rptr. 806, 809 (1968); CAL. CiV. CODE
§§ 4380, 4384 (Deering 1984); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 699.080, 699.510 (Deering 1983).
' See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1986); H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.10,
at 471.
184 See, e.g., Gonzales v. District Court, 629 P.2d 1074, 1075 (Colo. 1981) (a contempt pro-
ceeding is considered a continuance of dissolution action); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 244 (Mc-
Kinney 1986).
185 H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.10, at 472; Divorce and Separation, supra note 163, § 1060,
at 1047.
188 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gilmore, 672 P.2d 228, 230 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (judgment
for arrearages is collectable like any judgment); Thacker Constr. Co. v. Williams, 154 Ga.
App. 670, 671, 269 S.E.2d 519, 521 (1980) (alimony and child support judgments are money
judgments and may be enforced in same manner as other judgments).
1087 See, e.g., Kephart v. Kephart, 193 F.2d 677, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ("an award of alimony
is a judgment for money, on which execution may issue"), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944 (1952);
Thompson v. Thompson, 233 Or. 262, 270-71, 378 P.2d 281, 285 (1963) (divorce decree re-
quiring defendant to pay money is judgment enforceable by execution sale); Divorce and
Separation, supra note 163, § 751, at 737-38. See also H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.10, at
473 (alimony decrees as creating judgment liens).
188 See, e.g., Keen v. Keen, 191 Md. 31, 40, 60 A.2d 200, 205 (1948) (property must be at-
tached prior to judgment in order to be seized for payment of alimony). See Divorce and
Separation, supra note 163, § 556, at 570.
"88 See, e.g., Failing v. Failing, 4 111. 2d 11, 122 N.E.2d 167 (1954). See Divorce and Separa-
tion, supra note 163, § 556, at 569.
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of the obligor's wages. 90 Garnishment is not appropriate to enforce the
payment of permanent alimony where arrearages of alimony are not auto-
matically considered final judgments or have not been reduced to final
judgment.191 In addition, there are federally established ceilings limiting
the percentage of weekly disposable income that can be garnished.'9 2
In extreme cases, the court may order a receiver to take the obligor's
property. This is done when there is a showing of necessity, such as the
obligor's mismanagement or debt; where there is a risk that the obligor
will leave the jurisdiction with the property;91 or where the obligor has
left the jurisdiction without paying the arrearages.9 4 Placing a person's
property in a receivership is a harsh remedy because the owner is de-
prived of the right to custody and management of his property. The im-
position of the receivership functions to allow an in rem proceeding to
render the property subject to a judgment for alimony.
Sequestration is another remedy over which the court has broad dis-
cretion. Sequestration allows the court to take possession of the obligor's
property to enforce compliance with the alimony decree.195 This remedy
is generally limited to situations in which it has been proved that the
defaulting spouse will likely dispose of the property in order to delay or
avoid enforcement.'9 6
190 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.56 (West 1988) (garnishment); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-
206 (1987) (payment made to clerk of the district court), § 40-4-207 (assignment of earn-
ings); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7 (1985) (security by means of bond, mortgage, deed of trust,
assignment of wages, attachment and garnishment); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.130
(1986) (assignment of earnings).
191 See, e.g., Sturgill v. Sturgill, 49 N.C. App. 578, 272 S.E.2d 423 (1980) (garnishment not
appropriate for prospective earnings). See also Divorce and Separation, supra note 163, §
749, at 735 (enforcement of judgments, decrees and orders).
" See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1671-77 (1982). Section 1673(a) sets the maximum allowable garnish-
ment at the lesser of either twenty-five percent of a spouse's disposable earnings for the
week or the amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed 30 times the
federal minimum hourly wage. Id. § 1673(a).
' See, e.g., Garrelts v. Garrelts, 101 Mich. App. 71, 77, 300 N.W.2d 454, 456 (1980) (ap-
pointment of receiver appropriate where parties consent and there is evidence of misappro-
priation of funds); Raskind v. Raskind, 62 App. Div. 2d 952, 952-53, 404 N.Y.S.2d 17, 18 (1st
Dep't 1978) (mem.) (wife may be appointed receiver for sale of husband's medical practice
to satisfy alimony and child support arrears); Divorce and Separation, supra note 163, §
785, at 766, 768 (court's powers to appoint receivers).
'" See Divorce and Separation, supra note 163, § 785, at 768.
'9' See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.24 (West 1988) (sequestration of personal estate, rents
and profits of real estate); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West 1987) (sequestration upon re-
fusal to give reasonable security or upon default in complying with support order); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 243 (McKinney 1986) (security for payments, sequestration and appoint-
ment of receiver); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-57103 (1987) (posting a bond, sequestering rents
profits, appointment of a receiver, lien against real and personal property of the obligor);
Divorce and Separation, supra note 163, § 785, at 769.
'" See, e.g., Kunzeck v. Kunzeck, 102 Misc. 2d 607, 608-09, 424 N.Y.S.2d 77, 79 (Sup. Ct.
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The obligor may be required to post a bond as security for payment
of alimony and child support as it accrues.1 9 7 This remedy is employed
where there is a showing that the spouse may make it difficult to enforce
the support order by leaving the jurisdiction or by not complying with the
order. 98 An injunction may also be issued when a spouse threatens to
transfer property. 9 '
In summary, most states have statutory authority allowing the court
to enforce the court order for alimony payments by means of attachment,
garnishment, a lien on property of the obligor spouse, execution, assign-
ment of wages and withholding of the obligor's earnings. A further rem-
edy is the Writ of Ne Exeat which is "in the nature of civil bail .... A
party seeking to obtain such a restraint upon the liberty of another must
make a proper showing of: (1) a threatened departure of the defendant
from the jurisdiction; and (2) a resulting defeat of the court's power to
give effective in personam relief ...."I"
The Child Support Enforcement Legislation of 1975201 was amended
and significantly strengthened in 1984.202 Most states have implemented
this type of legislation which often applies to "dependents," including
spouses, ex-spouses and children, entitled to payments pursuant to an ali-
rhony or support order.2"' Generally, states' laws have implemented the
federal legislation to require withholding child support (and alimony)
from the paychecks of parents/ex-spouses who were delinquent for a
month. If employers do not fully comply with the program, they will be
held responsible. This approach is designed to obviate many of the en-
Erie County 1979) (sequestration is a remedy).
"' See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.18 (West 1985) (bond); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-5-127 (1987)
(cash deposit or bond); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.7 (1985) (security by means of bond, mort-
gage, deed of trust, assignment of wages, attachment and garnishment); TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-5-103 (1987) (posting a bond, sequestering rents profits, appointment of a receiver, lien
against real and personal property of obligor).
19 See, e.g., Stern v. Stern, 75 So. 2d 810, 812 (Fla. 1954) (evidence of prior willful default
necessary to require ex-husband to post bond or other security for future alimony pay-
ments); Divorce and Separation, supra note 163, § 771, at 754-55.
1"9 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.11 (West 1985) (injunction ordered when either party is
about to remove property from the state or fraudulently convey or conceal it); WYo. STAT. §
20-2-112 (1977) (attachment, commitment, injunction or other means); H. CLARK, supra
note 1, § 14.10, at 472.
"'o See Gredone v. Gredone, 361 A.2d 176, 179-80 (D.C. 1976); see also AREEN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 671 (2d ed. 1985).
201 See Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2354 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 654 (1982)).
202 See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1311
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 654 (Supp. II 1984)). See also 49 Fed. Reg. 36,780 (1984)
(proposal implementing regulations); Comment, Constitutional Implications of the Child
Support Amendments of 1984, 24 J. FAM. L. 301 (1985-86).
203 See, e.g., Effron, supra note 156, at 27.
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forcement mechanisms which are triggered by default. States also have
programs for wage deduction to avoid default and measures which are
sometimes counter-productive, such as jail for contempt after default.
The states are also required to promulgate laws which impose liens on
parties' property when they are in default for over $1000.2o4 Unpaid sup-
port may be deducted from federal and state income tax refunds. Counsel
should be aware that some or all of these provisions may apply to ali-
mony, as well as to child support.
An additional boon to enforcement is found in the Domestic Rela-
tions Tax Reform Act of 1984 ("DRTRA"). While most parties do not
choose to pay alimony in order to receive the tax benefits, attorneys must
be aware of the tax consequences of the DRTRA. Significant tax conse-
quences (positive for the obligee, negative for the defaulting obligor) will
arise due to defaults on alimony orders entered after January 1, 1985.0"
Furthermore, section 311(a) of the 1974 Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act permits a court to order that maintenance payments be made to an
officer of the court.206 Section 311(f) provides that when the obligor is
beyond the jurisdiction of the court, the prosecutor may institute any
other enforcement proceeding available under the laws of the state."0 7
The principal mechanisms for enforcing out-of-state support obliga-
tions are the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
("URESA") and its statutory revision. 08 This Act provides a simplified
means to interstate enforcement of support orders. It has been adopted in
some form by every state. Therefore, URESA has prompted state legisla-
tion which has greatly enhanced the opportunity to enforce alimony and
other support judgments against out-of-state obligors. URESA is
designed to improve reciprocal enforcement opportunities. 0 9 The courts
204 See KRAUSE, QUESTIONS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 107, at 130.
'05 See Effron, supra note 156, at 27. See also Asimow, Deducting Alimony and Child Sup-
port and Avoiding Recapture Under the DRA, 63 J. TAX'N 150 (1985) (use of grantor trusts
and other available techniques to avoid loss of alimony deduction); Brown, Sexist Sleepers
in Domestic Relations Provisions of the 1984 Tax Reform Act, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 39
(1985) (discussion of sex bias in regard to tax aspects of alimony); Dragutsky, Taxation of
Separations and Divorces Under the DRA, 16 TAx ADVISER 209 (1985) (explanation of tax
aspects of DRTRA).
200 See UNIFORM ACT, supra note 113, § 311, 9A U.L.A. 444-45. This statute was adopted in
substantial form in Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana
(omits § 311(f)) and Washington.
... Id. § 311(f); see Divorce and Separation, supra note 163, § 751, at 737.
"I See REVISED UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 381-552 (1987)
[hereinafter RURESA]. The revised act was drafted in 1968 to replace the UNIF. RECIPROCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT OF 1950, 9A U.L.A. 553-608 (1987) [hereinafter URESA]. See
9B U.L.A. 381, 553.
... URESA, supra note 208, § 1, 9B U.L.A. at 394, 568; see Gingold v. Gingold, 161 Cal.
App. 3d 1177, 1184, 208 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127 (1984) (although in personam jurisdiction over a
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of the state of the obligee's residence are empowered by the legislation21
to send the complaint and prayer for enforcement to the state in which
the obligor resides.2 11 The enforcement action takes place in the "re-
sponding state. '212 The responding state has a duty to proceed to judg-
ment and, if appropriate, enforce the judgment"' and send copies of the
support order(s) to the initiating court. 1 4 Furthermore, the responding
state has the power to apply any terms and conditions to assure compli-
ance with its order including: requiring a cash deposit or a bond; requir-
ing periodic payments; punishing for contempt; and miscellaneous reme-
dies available to the courts of the state. 15 The responding state court has
the further obligation to send any payment made by the obligor to the
initiating state court.21 ' The initiating court has the duty to disburse all
payments made by the obligor to the appropriate person or agency.21 7
URESA provides a mechanism that is at once more convenient for the
obligor as well as the obligee and which is much more efficient than the
prior chaotic attempts at enforcement. It allows the defendant to exercise
all defenses and have all of the protections expressed in the constitution
and the statutes of his state of residence.
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, adopted in ap-
proximately sixteen states, provides an additional mechanism for enforce-
ment of foreign judgments.2 1 1 It has been held to allow enforcement of
already accrued alimony and child support.21 9 It is further noted that an-
other means of imposing a statutory duty of support and enforcing it is
accomplished through the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act.
22 1
non-resident defendant is necessary to modify a maintenance order, it is not required to
confirm the registration of a support order of a court of another jurisdiction which had
jurisdiction over him pursuant to RURESA); Moffat v. Moffat, 27 Cal. 3d 645, 652, 612 P.2d
967, 970, 165 Cal. Rptr. 877, 880 (1980) (RURESA enacted to enforce existing duties of
support against person legally liable for such support).
110 See RURESA, supra note 208, § 11(b), 9B U.L.A. at 440-41.
See id. § 14, 9B U.L.A. at 450.
sl' See id. § 2(1), 9B U.L.A. at 403 ("state in which any responsive proceeding pursuant to
the proceeding in the initiating state is commenced").
M See id. § 18, 9B U.L.A. at 461; id. § 19, 9B U.L.A. at 467; id. § 20, 9B U.L.A. at 469; id. §
24, 9B U.L.A. at 487-88.
... See id. § 25, 9B U.L.A. at 519.
s See id. § 26, 9B U.L.A. at 520.
010 See id. § 28, 9B U.L.A. at 527.
317 See id. § 29, 9B U.L.A. at 528.
S See REVISED UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 149 (1987); H.
CLARK, supra note 1, §14.12, at 480 (act adopted in some sixteen states).
"' See H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.12, at 480.
110 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 241-54 (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, §§ 441-53 (1981 & Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:1 to -A:12 (1974); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-1 to -13 (1957 & Supp. 1985).
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VIII. ENFORCEMENT AND THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state obligor pursuant to an ali-
mony order may be obtained via the state's long-arm legislation, provided
that the application of the statute is constitutionally permissible. Once
jurisdiction over the person is obtained, an issue which has troubled the
courts has been whether one state is obligated under the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution221 to enforce the support
order of a sister state. The general rule is that states owe full faith and
credit to final judgments and judicial orders of their sister states. Thus, as
payments accrue, they are generally considered to be final judgments
which are owed full faith and credit.22 However, if an order is not final, it
is not subject to the full faith and credit clause. This raises a serious
question as to alimony judgments which are generally considered to be
legally binding and final in terms of exhaustion of appeals, yet are modifi-
able. In this sense, alimony decrees are not final for any of their future
installments. Many courts have maintained that full faith and credit is
not owed to these non-final orders.22 ' This is also true for arrearages in
those states which allow retroactive modification.224 Even these retroac-
tively modifiable arrearages are owed as much credit as they received in
the states in which they were rendered.225 If an alimony obligation is en-
forced in a state other than the one that originally made the order, the
Supreme Court has held that due process requires that the defendant be
afforded an opportunity to litigate the question of modification.2 6 More-
over, as to either prospective or retroactive enforcement of such obliga-
"" See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof." Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). "Such Acts, records
and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which
they are taken." Id.
22 See Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73 COLUM. L.
REV. 289, 303 (1973).
111 See Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901); Divorce and Separation, supra note 163, §
756, at 740.
224 See, e.g., Zalek v. Brosseau, 47 N.J. Super. 521, 136 A.2d 416 (1957), aff'd, 26 N.J. 501,
141 A.2d 17 (1958); Zirkle v. Zirkle, 304 S.E.2d 664 (W. Va. 1983).
22' See KRAUSE, QUESTIONS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 107, at 228.
228 See Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 228 (1946) (judgment obtained in violation of proce-
dural due process not entitled to full faith and credit); see also id. at 236 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting). In Griffin, the Court held that if alimony obligations are enforced in a state
other than the one that rendered the original decree, at least as to the accrued arrearages,
due process requires that the defendant be afforded an opportunity to litigate the question
of modification. Id. at 233-34.
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tions, the enforcing state "has at least as much leeway to disregard the
judgment, to qualifyit, or to depart from it as does the State where it was
rendered." '
In 1901, the United States Supreme Court held that where future
alimony payments are modifiable, the decree is not entitled to full faith
and credit and equitable remedies do not have extraterritorial effect." 8
However, in 1910, the Supreme Court held that where a right to future
alimony is absolute and vested, a judgment for such payment is entitled
to full faith and credit in a sister state for the arrearage, even though the
judgment might be modified by future orders of the court.2 29 Neverthe-
less, if the arrearages are retroactively modifiable, they are not entitled to
full faith and credit unless they have been reduced to judgment. Thus, in
those states allowing retroactive modification, the obligee spouse must pe-
riodically reduce arrearages to judgment in the original state and then sue
on that judgment in the second state.
Some jurisdictions have held that the decree of a court of a sister
state for future payments of alimony and child support would be entitled
to full faith and credit whether or not the decree was modifiable.2 3 0 The
Illinois Supreme Court followed such a course based upon its notion of
comity, rather than full faith and credit. The court was not obligated by
the full faith and credit clause to enforce a Missouri court's order, but
comity, the policies of enforcing important judgments and of not allowing
sanctuaries to arise wherein obligors may be shielded from their obliga-
tions, strongly influenced the court.22  Thus, some courts will apparently
utilize notions of judicial comity to permit a person to enforce an alimony
2M7 New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947) (regarding full faith and
credit in child custody cases). See Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955)
(en banc); H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.11, at 475.
22 See Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901); see also Reese, Full Faith and Credit to For-
eign Equity Decrees, 42 IowA L. REV. 183, 191 (1957) (extra-territorial effect accorded par-
ticular traits of equity decrees).
22' Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 17 (1910). See also Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465,
283 P.2d 19 (1955) (en banc); Corliss v. Corliss, 89 N.M. 235, 549 P.2d 1070 (1976); Guercia
v. Guercia, 239 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (follows Sistare); H. CLARK, supra
note 1, § 14.11, at 475.
120 See, e.g., Light v. Light, 12 Ill. 2d 502, 511, 147 N.E.2d 34, 40 (1957) (Missouri divorce
decree entitled to full faith and credit as to future payments). See also Ex parte Barnett,
600 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Tex. 1980) (Texas courts empowered to enforce sister states' support
orders by contempt, when those orders comply with URESA and the Constitution); Guercia
v. Guercia, 239 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (husband held in contempt for failure to
pay child support pursuant to foreign divorce decree); Hill v. Hill, 153 W. Va. 392, 168
S.E.2d 803 (1969) (court has jurisdiction over action for arrearages in payments pursuant to
foreign divorce decree); H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.11, at 475; Comment, supra note 222,
at 305.
'3 See Light v. Light, 12 Ill. 2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1957).
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decree which is retroactively modifiable. Furthermore, the same principle
allows those states to permit the obligor spouse to seek modification of
the decree in the rendering state or in the enforcing state and to raise
defenses in the enforcing state which are available in the rendering
state2 82 As noted, comity functions as the principle motivating enforce-
ment of foreign judgments awarding alimony which comport with general
notions of due process, even though the Constitution does not require full
faith and credit for them.
28 3
Therefore, the due process clauses of the United States" 4 and state
constitutions must be taken into consideration in conjunction with full
faith and credit when considering the enforcement of a sister state's ali-
mony decree. When personal jurisdiction has not been obtained over the
obligor spouse or when sufficient notice has not been given, enforcement
of the rendering state's decree violates due process; the obligor spouse is
thereby deemed unable to seek modification or to assert defenses due to
lack of notice. 2 5 When arrearages have automatically become money
judgments and are not modifiable, the support decree is owed full faith
and credit and is enforceable when personal jurisdiction is obtained .2 1
Such an arrangement does not violate due process so long as the defend-
ant has all the protections and defenses available in the sister state.
While it appears that some jurisdictions will not give full faith and credit
to a decree involving something other than payment of money,3 7 others
apply principles of comity to enforce sister state and foreign decrees ap-
plicable to conveyances of land and payments of future alimony.
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IX. CONCLUSION
This article presents an overview of the development, purpose, func-
tion and measure of alimony. Alimony, although often associated with the
breakdown of marriage, may also serve as a social tool designed to protect
and compensate loyalty and devotion to the family unit. Coexistent with
this purpose is the need to equalize parties to a dissolved marriage. This
is the key to understanding alimony. A wholehearted adoption of this
view will help to realize the pro-family rhetoric which is often articulated
by the courts, the pulpit and the legislative chambers.
.. Comment, supra note 222, at 305.
133 See, e.g., Wolff v. Wolff, 40 Md. App. 168, 177, 389 A.2d 413, 420 (1978) (comity applica-
ble to decrees of foreign nations), af'd, 285 Md. 185, 401 A.2d 479 (1979).
U" .S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
sa See Divorce and Separation, supra note 163, § 754, at 739.
236 H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.11, at 475-76.
M3 Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 12 (1909); see H. CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.11, at 476-80.
118 See Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 472-73, 283 P.2d 19, 24 (1955) (en banc); H.
CLARK, supra note 1, § 14.11, at 479 & n.33.
